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Defendants reply herewith to the Brief of Appellees herein. 
ARGUMENT 
It is admitted in this case that Steams Lending, Inc. made a loan to appellant, evi-
denced by a note and secured by a trust deed, then sold the loan as part of a "securitiza-
tion" scheme. "Securitization," in simplest terms, sells debts on mortgage loans to a se-
curities broker, which "pools" them, and re-sells them as "mortgage-backed securities." 
Originating lenders are paid off in the first sale. Appellees herein are the "nominee," 
Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. ("MERS"), of Steams, and Citimortgage, 
Inc., to which MERS assigned the trust deed long after the sale of the loan by Steams. 
The Complaint was filed in response to Citimortgage's attempt to foreclose. 
The Complaint asserts the securitization, and that the trust deed followed the sale of 
the loan, lodging any right to foreclose in the current owner(s) of the debt, under §57-1-
35,UCA(1953). 
Appellees filed a motion to dismiss. Recognizing that if the facts alleged in the 
Complain were taken as true, the motion must be denied, the district court maneuvered 
around appellant's response by converting the motion to one for summary judgment 
without notice. Ruling, p.3 et seq. 
Citing the rule on summary judgment that the "adverse party may not rest upon the 
mere allegations or denials of the pleadings," the district court held that as appellant had 
not submitted (and would not be permitted to submit) evidence in support of the factual 
allegations of the Complaint, appellees were entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The 
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factual allegation of the Complaint, wholly uncontested by appellees, that the loan had 
been sold, activating § 57-1-35, UCA (1953), was treated as "mere conclusory allegations 
in a pleading, unsupported by a recitation of relevant surrounding facts." Ruling at 6. 
That is, lack of submission of evidence in the converted motion transformed the factual 
obligations of the complaint into mere conclusory allegations. 
Appellees now concede that the district court's maneuver was without authority and 
erroneous. The motion was required to be treated as one to dismiss. 
Nevertheless, appellees now claim, upon the ground that the Court of Appeals may 
affirm on an alternative basis, that the ruling below can now be affirmed treating the mo-
tion as one to dismiss. This ignores the fairly plain fact that the district court would have 
denied the motion to dismiss. The apparent explanation for improperly attempting to 
shift the burden of proof by conversion to a motion for summary judgment was to avoid 
the inevitable result on motion to dismiss. 
Further, appellee's renewed claim that "even if the note was securitized, Citi and 
MERS are still entitled to enforce it," is simply blank defiance of the statute. Not only is 
it not "the great weight of authority" that sale of a debt does not transfer all rights under 
the security, there is no authority to such effect. 
The correct disposition here is to remand to the district court with instructions to 
treat the motion as one to dismiss. Presuming, however, that the district court might have 
granted such a motion, appellees' arguments are treated here as a defense of such a deci-
sion. 
Securitization Cases 
This is an action respecting a "securitized" loan - one in which the debt is pooled 
with similar debts and sold as "mortgage backed securities" ("MBS"). The debt is evi-
denced by a Note, and secured by a Trust Deed. The general process of securitization is 
described below. 
The Securitization Process 
The process of securitization (see In re Weisband, Case No. 4:09-bk-05175-EHW 
(D. Ariz., 3/29/10) (copy attached, Exhibit "A") involves the "pooling" of debts on many 
such notes. The process is essentially identical whether conducted by a government 
sponsored agency, such as Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac, or by a "boutique" securitizer. 
Pooling occurs when the loans are sold by the originator(s) to a securities broker. The 
pooled debt is then "sold" to a Special Purpose Vehicle ("SPV") "trust". This "sale," 
however, is in the form of an exchange. The "trust" takes the loans in original form, 
and returns them ("in exchange for") in the form of "certificates." The pooled debt, in 
the form of the "certificates" is then sold by the securities broker to investors. Purchas-
ers receive "certificates", as new evidence of the debt. The certificates entitle buyers to 
receive payment of the debt. Further, the sale of "certificates" which create a security 
interest in the debts creates a security interest in the trust deeds. § 70A-9a-203(7), 
UCA (1953). This is in keeping with § 57-1-35, UCA (1953), which provides that 
"transfer of any debt secured by a trust deed shall operate as a transfer of the security 
therefor." 
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The "trust," having thus been stripped of assets, generally performs no further 
services. 
This series of transactions is generally represented by a series of documents, in-
cluding a transfer by the originating lender(s) to a securities broker (commonly, a 
"Mortgage Loan Purchase Agreement"), a transfer of the loans by the broker to a 
"trust," (a "Mortgage Loan Sale and Assignment Agreement"), and an over-all "Pooling 
and Servicing Agreement." 
It is typical in securitization that original notes are placed in the hands of a "cus-
todian". It is common that original notes are thereafter "held" by the "custodian", to be 
dealt with on behalf of the certificate owners. It is plain that the "custodian" is not a 
"holder", or "holder in due course" of the notes, because the custodian does not take the 
notes "for value," or with intent that it can enforce them in its own right, as required by 
§§ 70A-3-203, 70A-3-302(i)(b), UCA (1953). Further, as there can only be one evi-
dence of the debt, negotiability of the Notes is reduced. It is governed by ownership of 
the "certificates". That is, negotiable instruments are converted into securities. § 70-A-
9a-203(7), UCA (1953). 
The Right to Foreclose Has Been Transferred 
According to the SEC, "mortgage backed securities are debt obligations that rep-
resent claims to cash flows from pools of mortgage loans." There is no question that 
investors in mortgage backed securities receive transfer of the debt. The issue then be-
4 
comes the effect of §57-1-35, UCA (1953): "The transfer of any debt secured by a trust 
deed shall operate as a transfer of the security therefor." 
The arrangement is one by which an originator of loans "sells" them to a paper trust, 
then takes them back in a different form. As re-acquired, the debts have been "pooled", 
and are now represented by certificates constituting parts of the pooled debts (the "Trust 
Fund"). The certificates entitle the owners to collect the debts. There is no question that 
the certificates represent actual ownership of the debts. The investments are "mortgage-
backed securities" (MBS). See Peterson, 28 Cardozo Law Review 2185 (2007) at 2200 
et. seq. 
At the time of the Pooling and Servicing Agreement, the pool trustee enters into a 
servicing agreement with a third party, and a "custodian agreement" with a further party. 
The purpose of the servicing agreement is to make collection on the debts, purportedly 
for allotment to the holders of certificates. Under the custodian agreement, the custodian 
keeps the original notes safe for the benefit of the certificate holders and the trustee of the 
purported trust. It is difficult, however, to define an interest of the trustee in the notes fol-
lowing sale of the certificates (unless the trustee is a purchaser of certificates). 
The Pooling and Servicing Agreement is not executed by the investors. 
To the extent that it represents an agreement for services not to be performed within 
one year, a transfer of an interest in realty, including the trustee's powers under a deed of 
trust, or an agency agreement, the servicing agreement is subject to the statute of frauds. 
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Further, an agreement subject to the statute of frauds cannot be assigned or assumed, ex-
cept by a writing which satisfies the statute of frauds. §§ 25-5-1, 25-5-4, UCA (1953). 
Thus, even it it could be held that the servicer hired by the lender has authority to 
foreclose on behalf of the lender (an issue subject to serious question), such authority 
terminates upon sale of the certificates, absent some further agreement signed by the in-
vestors. (It cannot be signed for them by the pool trustee. An agreement establishing a 
trust is also subject to the statute of frauds.) 
Where the case involves a securitized debt, and MERS is the defendant, the chain 
of foreclosure authority is even more attenuated. As United States District Judge Clark 
Waddoups noted recently in such a case: 
MERS has no ownership interest in the Note, but 
is only acting as a nominee beneficiary. 
Cox v. Recontrust Co., Case No. 2:10-CV-492 CW, Memorandum Decision 06/18/10. 
Of course, without an ownership interest, there is no authority to foreclose. The same 
result has been reached in numerous cases. See Mortgage Electronic Registration Sys-
tems, Inc. v. Chong, Dist. Ct. Case No. 2:09-CV-00661-KJD-LRL, Bankr. Ct. Case No. 
BK-S-07-16645-LBR (D. Nev. 2009 en banc) (copy attached, Exhibit "B"), and In re 
Walker, Case No. 10-21656-E-ll, (E. Dist. Calif. 5/20/10), (copy attached, Exhibit 
"C"): 
Further, several courts have acknowledged that MERS is not 
the owner of the underlying note and therefore could not 
transfer the note, the beneficial interest in the deed of trust, or 
foreclose upon the property secured by the deed. See In re 
Foreclosure Cases, 521 F. Supp. 2d 650, 653 (S.D. Oh. 2007); 
In re Vargas, 396 B.R. 511, 520 (Bankr. CD. Cal. 2008); 
Landmark Nat'l Bank v. Kesler, 216 P.3d 158 (Kan. 2009); 
LaSalle Bank v. Lamy, 824 N.Y. S. 2d 769 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
2006). Since no evidence of MERS' ownership of the under-
lying note has been offered, and other courts have concluded 
that MERS does not own the underlying notes, this court is 
convinced that MERS had no interest it could transfer to Citi-
bank. 
Since MERS did not own the underlying note, it could not 
transfer the beneficial interest of the Deed of Trust to another. 
Any attempt to transfer the beneficial interest of a trust deed 
with out ownership of the underlying note is void under Cali-
fornia law. Therefore Citibank has not established that it is 
entitled to assert a claim in this case. 
The Actual Claim 
The basis of plaintiff's position in this matter is quite simple. Under ancient com-
mon law, the sale of a debt entailed any security for the debt. Carpenter v. Longan, 83 
U.S. 271, 275 (1872); Donaldson v. Grant, 49 Pac. 776, 781, (Utah 1897). The common 
law rule that "the security follows the debt9' was first codified in California in 1842: 
"The assignment of a debt secured by mortgage carries with it the security." Cal. Civ. 
Code § 2936. The rule first set down as to mortgages has been codified in Utah with spe-
cific regard to trust deeds: "The transfer of any debt secured by a trust deed shall operate 
as a transfer of the security therefor." § 57-1-35, UCA (1953). 
The effect of this is stated succinctly in In re Vargas, 396 B.R. 511, 516-17 (Bankr. 
CD. Calif. 2008): 
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A secured promissory note traded on the secondary mortgage 
market remains secured because the mortgage follows the 
note. CAL. CIV.CODE § 2936 ("The assignment of a debt 
secured by mortgage carries with it the security."). California 
codified this principle in 1872. Similarly, this has long been 
the law throughout the United States: when a note secured by 
a mortgage is transferred, "transfer of the note carries with it 
the security, without any formal assignment or delivery, or 
even mention of the latter." Carpenter v. Longan. 16 Wall. 
271r 83 U.S. 271. 275, 21 L.Ed. 313 (1872). - - G i v e n that 
"the debt is the principal thing and the mortgage an acces-
sory," the Supreme Court reasoned that, as a corollary, "[t]he 
mortgage can have no separate existence." Carpenter, 83 
U.S. at 274, 16 Wall. 271. For this reason, "an assignment of 
the note carries the mortgage with it, while an assignment of 
the latter alone is a nullity." Id at 274, 16 Wall. 271. While 
the note is "essential," the mortgage is only "an incident" to 
the note. Id. 
Thus, ifFHMhas transferred the note, MERS is no 
longer an authorized agent of the holder unless it has a sepa-
rate agency contract with the new undisclosed principal 
MERS presents no evidence as to who owns the note, or of 
any authorization to act on behalf of the present owner 
(Emphasis added.) 
Securitization involves a series of sales of the debt. Generally a lender aggregates a 
large number of loans, and sells them to a securities broker. The broker then forms a 
Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV), generally in the form of a "trust" with a "trustee." The 
broker ("Depositor") delivers the loans to the trustee "in exchange for" "certificettes" 
representing the right to collect the debt. The broker resells the Certificates to investors 
as "mortgage-backed securities" ("MBS"). 
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Under the common and statutory law of Utah, the effect of this series of sales of the 
debt is to lodge the beneficial interest in the security, the trust deed, in the investors in the 
MBS. 
It is not plaintiffs position that securitization "splits" the debt and the security, or 
that it renders either unenforceable. It is plaintiffs position that securitization lodges 
both in the investors in MBS, who alone can enforce them. Original lenders, and those 
who are not the end purchasers in the securitization, have been paid off, and cannot fore-
close or enforce in their own right. Their only potential right of enforcement can only be 
as agents of the investors in MBS. 
To assert the latter right, defendants would need to show their status as agents of 
such investors. If such status exists, it must exist in the series of securitization docu-
ments. Bank of New York v. Raftogianis, No. F-7356-09, Sup. Ct. of New Jersey (6/29/ 
10); (copy attached, Exhibit "D"); U.S. Bank, N.A. v. Ibanez, No. 10694 Supreme Ct. of 
Massachusetts (1/7/11) (copy attached, Exhibit "E"). 
The Note and Trust Deed in Issue 
It is common in cases like the present to ignore the terms of the subject Notes and 
Trust Deeds, except the references in the Trust Deeds to MERS. 
The Note in this matter (Exhibit "A", Addendum to Brief of Appellees) provides: 
The Lender or anyone who takes this Note by transfer 
and who is entitled to receive payments under this Note is 
called the "Note Holder." 
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If I am in default, the Note Holder may send me a 
written notice telling me that if I do not pay the overdue 
amount by a certain date, the Note Holder may require me 
to pay immediately the full amount of Principal that has not 
been paid and all the interest that I owe on that amount. 
That date must be at least 30 days after the date on which 
the notice is mailed to me or delivered by other means. 
Even if, at a time when I am in default, the Note 
Holder does not require me to pay immediately in full as 
described above, the Note Holder will still have the right to 
do so if I am in default at a later time. 
The Trust Deed contains coordinating provisions as follows: 
Acceleration; Remedies. Lender shall give notice 
to Borrower prior to acceleration following Borrower's 
breach of any covenant or agreement in this Security In-
strument (but not prior to acceleration under Section 18 
unless Applicable Law provides otherwise). The notice 
shall specify: (a) the default; (b) the action required to 
cure the default; (c) a date, not less than 30 days from the 
date the notice is given to Borrower, by which the default 
must be cured; and (d) that failure to cure the default on or 
before the date specified in the notice may result in accel-
eration of the sums secured by this Security Instrument 
and sale of the Property. The notice shall further inform 
Borrower of the right to reinstate after acceleration and the 
right to bring a court action to assert the non-existence of 
a default or any other defense of Borrower to acceleration 
and sale. If the default is not cured on or before the date 
specified in the notice, Lender at its option may require 
immediate payment in full of all sums secured by this Se-
curity Instrument without further demand and may invoke 
the power of sale and any other remedies permitted by 
Applicable Law. Lender shall be entitled to collect all ex-
penses incurred in pursuing the remedies provided in this 
Section 22, including, but not limited to, reasonable attor-
neys' fees and costs of title evidence. 
Under such provisions, the holder of the debt - the person entitled to receive pay-
ments under the Note - has the option, in case of non-payment, to accelerate the loan, or 
to defer collection to a later time. Enforcement, including acceleration, requires the send-
ing of a written notice. In the absence of the proper written notice, waiver is presumed. 
Collection may be waived repeatedly, to and including the last installment on the loan. 
The written notice required by the Note plainly is not the statutory Notice of Default sub-
sequently sent by a trustee of the Trust Deed. 
The right to accelerate belongs exclusively to the owner of the debt. It does not 
belong to the trustee of the trust deed. The trustee must await a proper acceleration of the 
loan by the owner of the debt before the trustee can initiate foreclosure under the trust 
deed. That is, even if it were possible to leave the trust deed in the hands of the lender or 
its nominee following sale of the loan, the result would not be to lodge a right to fore-
close in the lender or nominee. Foreclosure could only be initiated by the owner of the 
debt (the holder of the note) by acceleration. 
There is no evidence that any notice of acceleration was ever sent, by anyone, in 
this case. It is not even claimed that any defendant, acting as a properly appointed agent 
of the then owner of the debt sent a notice of acceleration. Without examining the docu-
ments, based wholly upon failure to make payments to a lender who has sold the debt and 
is no longer entitled to receive payments, the district court finds a "default" justifying 
foreclosure. There is simply no evidence, or viable claim, of such a default in this case. 
The "Contract'' Theory of Trust Deeds in the District of Utah 
l l 
Appellees rely upon a series of cases in the Utah federal district court which pre-
sume that an originating lender never sold the loan, and therefore maintained a right to 
foreclose, which it could hire the remaining defendants, including MERS, to enforce. 
Such cases, Burnett v. MERS, 2009 WL 3582294 (D. Utah Oct. 27, 2009); Rhodes v. 
Aurora Loan Servs., 2010 U.S. Dist. Ct. LEXIS 83133, *6 (D. Utah 2010); McGinnis v. 
GMACMort Corp., 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 90286 *7 (D. Utah 2010), and others are in-
apposite to the present case. They do not involve the central fact of transfer of the loan. 
A number of the federal court cases rely upon simple misquotation of an inapposite case, 
La-Rota Florez v. Goldman Sachs Mtg. Co., 2010 WL 1444026 (E. D. Va. 2010), for a 
proposition which is irrelevant as well as incorrect. See, e.g., Commonwealth Property 
Advocates v. MERS, Case No. 2:10-CV-00340-TS (D. Utah 9/20/10); Commonwealth 
Property Advocates v. First Horizon Home Loans, Case No. 2:10-CV-00375 (D. Utah 11/ 
16/10). They are unreported decisions, most of which are on appeal. 
Sale of the subject loan in a securitization activated § 57-1-35, UCA 91953): 
The transfer of any loan secured by trust deed shall operate as a 
transfer of the security therefor. 
Thereupon, the defense alleged by appellees' motion to dismiss collapses. 
This is not affected by the fact that the trust deed in this or other cases refers to 
MERS as "nominee" for lender and lender's "successors and assigns." Only the lender 
can make such a "nomination." Borrower/trustor, who alone signs the trust deed, can 
agree to recognize such nomination, but cannot make a further nomination binding upon 
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persons who, as a matter of law, succeed to the beneficial interest in the trust deed. Fur-
ther, the trust deed specifically incorporates local law (see Definition "J" thereof), which 
includes § 57-1-35, UCA (1953). That is, those who rely upon the trust deed agree that 
sale of the debt passes rights under the trust deed to the new owner of the debt, who then 
has any right to "nominate" an agent to exercise such rights. 
Simply stated, this means that upon sale of a loan, in a securitization or otherwise, 
original "nominees," such as MERS, lose any right to exercise any power under the trust 
deed, or to otherwise deal with it, absent some further agreement with the new owner of 
the debt. This includes at least any right to substitute trustees, or to foreclose, or to assign 
the trust deed. All such actions by MERS in the present case following sale of the loan as 
part of a securitization, were simply void. 
The trust deed (which is not a contract) was executed only by the borrower. It 
expressly incorporates local law, including § 57-1-35. The borrower cannot unilaterally 
contract in the trust deed, in violation of § 57-1-35, to make MERS the agent of subse-
quent buyers of the loan. A separate contract, executed by the present owner(s) of the 
debt and MERS would suffice: but no one here suggests that any such contract exists. 
Such a separate contract would have to be in writing executed by the present owner of 
the debt, under the Utah Statute of Frauds, §§ 25-5-1, 25-5-4(e), UCA (1953), because 
it would assign a trust power over realty, and create an agency to sell realty. 
The limits of the local federal court "contract" rulings are plain. 
13 
It may be conceded that a lender may appoint a "nominee" to act for it in exercis-
ing such powers as it has under a trust deed. It remains curious what the need for such a 
stand-in could be, and it may be observed that the federal court has never asked to see 
any agreement between the lender and MERS constituting such "nomination." Many 
courts simply reject this "straw man" theory of the status of MERS as mere surplusage. 
E.g., Landmark Nat'l Bank v. Kessler, 216 R 3d 158 (Kans. 2009); In re Foreclosure 
Cases, 521 F. Supp. 2d 650, 653 (S.D. Ohio 2007); In re Walker, Case No. 10-21656-E-ll 
(E. Dist. Calif. 5/20/10). 
The borrower, who alone signs the trust deed, cannot make such a nomination for 
lender. Borrower can only agree to recognize lender's "nominee." Given that the trust 
deed incorporates § 57-1-35 UCA (1953), borrower cannot decline to recognize the new 
owner of the debt or his "nominee." 
In all of this, all courts, including those in the District of Utah, recognize that the 
lender, despite the "nomination," initially retains ownership of the debt. MERS obtains 
no ownership. Cox v. Recontrust Co., Case No. 2:10-CV-492 CW (D. Utah 6/19/10). 
So long, therefore, as MERS acts strictly as the alter-ego of the lender under the trust 
deed, there is not necessarily such separation of the debt and the security as renders the 
security unenforceable under the statute (§ 57-1-35, UCA (1953)) and common law. 
Donaldson v. Grant, 49 Pac. 776, 781 (Utah 1897). Ultimately, the result is the same in 
these cases whether the court recognizes the right of MERS to proceed as "nominee", or 
14 
ignores such nomination and requires the lender to proceed in his own name: foreclosure 
proceeds on behalf of the lender. 
In securitizations, however, the lender retains the debt for the very purpose of sell-
ing it, and does so. All courts recognize lenders' right to do so despite "nomination" of 
MERS in the trust deed. Sale of the debt transfers all rights under the trust deed, includ-
ing any right to nominate MERS to exercise rights under the trust deed. Nothing in any 
recognition by borrower of lenders' nomination of MERS can change this. Lender ceases 
to have any rights under the trust deed upon which MERS can act in lender's behalf. If 
MERS would act on behalf of the new owner of the debt, it must show its new "nomina-
tion" to do so. In re Vargas, supra; MERS v. Chong, supra; In re Sheridan, supra. 
Any theory upon which, following sale of the debt by lender, MERS retains rights 
in the trust deed, except as agent of the new owner of the debt, plainly effects a separation 
of the debt and security, rendering the security unenforceable. Carpenter v. Longan, su-
pra; Donaldson v. Grant, supra. Such a "contract" would simply be void as in contra-
vention of law, § 57-1-35, UCA(1953). 
The recent federal district court decision in Marty v. MERS, No. l:10-cv-00033 (D. 
Utah 10/19/10) offers no support for any other conclusion. The part of Marty which sug-
gests that the rule that the security follows the debt may be rendered inapposite by the 
distinction in Utah law between mortgages (to which the rule applies) and trust deeds (to 
which it may not) (see Marty, pp. 9-11) is dealt with by observing that the statute, §57-1-
35, UCA (1953), expressly applies the rule to trust deeds. There is no question that in 
15 
Utah, sale of the debt transfers the beneficial interest in any trust deed, and that this is 
precisely the same rule as applies to mortgages. Otherwise, Marty purports to be based 
upon the principle that "there is no reason to conclude that MERS could not contract with 
Plaintiff and other parties to maintain the power to foreclose despite the conveyance of 
the ownership of the debt as long as MERS were to act on behalf of those parties who 
have the ultimate right to collect the debt " Marty, p. 11 (emphasis added). This principle 
is recognized in many cases (e.g., Chong; Walker; Vargas, etc.): MERS could make a 
new contract with the new owner of the debt to act as "nominee" for the new owner of 
the debt (and have the arrangement acknowledged by "Plaintiff borrower). All such 
cases, however, require that MERS show such new contract. Nothing in Marty directly 
asserts that, if challenged, MERS could proceed without showing such new contract. 
If Marty were to stand for the conclusion that, following a securitization, MERS 
owns the trust deed without showing a further contract to act as "nominee" for the new 
owner of the debt, the ruling must be based upon a theory that ownership of the debt and 
the security can be separated in violation of the law to the contrary, or simply upon a no-
tion that adding MERS as "nominee" in the trust deed is a trick that can be played to 
avoid the law that the security follows the debt. In either case, Marty would be wrong on 
its face. 
All of this means that once a securitization has occurred, the original lender and its 
"nominee" transfer to others any right to assign, exercise or enforce any right under the 
trust deed, and may not exercise any such right absent proof of an agency to represent the 
16 
new owners of the debt. Raftogianis, supra. Such agency must be found in the securiti-
zation documents. 
A series of robo-rulings in the federal court (see, e.g., Commonwealth Property 
Advocates, LLC v. First Horizon Home Loan Corp., No. 2:10-CV-375 DB (D. Utah 11/ 
16/10); Foster v. BAC Home Loan Servicing L.P.y 2:10-CV-247 TS (D. Utah 9/22/10); 
Taylor v. Citimortgage, No. 2:10-CV-505 TS (D. Utah 1/28/11)) has, embarrassingly, re-
peated a misquotation of an inapposite Eastern District of Virginia case, Larota-Florez v. 
Goldman Sachs Mortgage Co., 2010 WL 1444026, for the irrelevant and erroneous 
proposition that "securitization merely creates 4a separate contract, distinct from Plain-
tiff[']s debt obligations under the reference credit (i.e. the Note)'" La-Rota Florez is a 
summary judgment decision noting particularly that securitization was not shown. 
Larota-Florez actually says only that a credit default swap ("CDS") may be regarded as a 
separate contract from a note. This has nothing at all to do with whether a securitization 
of a debt could be sensibly regarded as a "separate contract" from the note, or whether 
such a nonsensical conclusion could affect application of § 57-1-35, UCA (1953). The 
proposition that transfer of a debt is a "separate contract" from creation of the debt - true 
as far as it goes - provides no exception to the statutory rule that the security follows the 
debt, and has no bearing upon the claims in this case. The conclusion, erroneously based 
upon Larota-Florez, which says nothing of the sort, that "securitization merely creates 'a 
separate contract, distinct from Plaintiff[']s debt obligations under the note'" does 
17 
not address any matter at issue, or show that sale of a debt in a securitization has any ef-
fect other than that specified by § 57-1-35, UCA (1953) in any other transfer of the debt. 
Defendants now rely upon a series of cases arising under the California non-
judicial foreclosure statute, and beginning with Hafiz v. Greenpoint Mortgage Funding, 
Inc., 652 F. Supp. 2d 1039, 1043 (N.D. Calif. 2009). See also Lane v. Vitek Real Estate 
Indus. Group, 713 F. Supp. 2d 1092, 1099 (E. D. Calif. 2010); Waqavesi v, Indymac Fed. 
Bank, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 105555 (11/11/09). A first reading of Hafiz indicates the 
reach of these cases. Hafiz notes, in response to a claim that plaintiffs "have not pro-
duced the original promissory note" because "the original promissory note was as-
signed to a trust pool," that the California statute does not require production of the 
note to initiate foreclosure. Hafiz does not deal with whether sale of the debt in a secu-
ritization transfers the power to foreclose. This is also true of Lane and Waqavesi: they 
render no decision on the affect of securitization. They have no further reach than the 
Burnett line of cases in the District of Utah. Certainly, they do not represent that secu-
ritization does not affect the servicer's right to enforce a note or deed of trust. They do 
not represent authority on securitization at all, or have the least affect upon the proper 
application of § 57-1-35 of the Utah Code. 
Finally, appellees assert that the Complaint does not allege that Steams sold the 
debt, and that the allegation of appellant's Brief that thereafter "defendant no longer had 
an interest to foreclose" is incorrect because it was Steams which sold the debt, not its 
"nominee" MERS. This is mere confusion. The allegation of the Complaint, in para-
18 
graph 19 is that "[t]he obligation under the Note was pooled and sold by Lender," and, in 
paragraph 38, that "[a]s a result of such transfers of the Note as a security, the Servicer, 
defendant Beneficiaries, and successor Trustee lacked authority to declare a default 
or otherwise pursue collection of the obligation " Transfer of the debt is plainly fac-
tually asserted. 
CONCLUSION 
The district court was required to deny appellees9 motion to dismiss. 
DATED this 4th day of April, 2011. 
E. Craig Sma^ Attorney fohAppellant 
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ORDERED. 
Dated: March 29,201Q 
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EILEEN W.HOLLOWELL 
U.S. Bankruptcy Judge 
6 I UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT 
7 I FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 
In re: 
BARRY WEISBAND, 
Debtor. 
Chapter 13 
Case No. 4:09-bk-05175-EWH 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The debtor, Barry Weisband ("Debtor"), hes challenged the standing of creditor, 
GMAC Mortgage, LLC ("GMAC"), to seek stay relief on his residence. After reviewing 
the documents provided by GMAC and conducting an evidentiary hearing, the court 
concludes that GMAC, the alleged servicer of the Debtor's home loan, lacks standing to 
seek stay relief. The reasons for this conclusion are explained in the balance of this 
decision. 
II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
A. Creation of Debtor's Note And Asserted Subsequent Transfers 
On or about October 6, 2006, the Debtor executed and delivered to GreenPoint 
Mortgage Funding, Inc. ("GreenPoinf) an adjustable rate promissory note in the 
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principal sum of $540,000 ("Note") secured by a Deed of Trust ("DOT") on real property 
located at 5424 East Placita Apan, Tucson, Arizona 857'. 8 ("Property"). 
On a separate piece of paper, GreenPoint endorsed the Note to GMAC 
("Endorsemenf). The Endorsement is undated. The DOT was signed by the Debtor on 
October 9, 2006, and recorded on October 13,2006. The DOT lists GreenPoint as the 
lender, and Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. ("MERS") as the beneficiary 
of the DOT "solely as nominee for [GreenPoint], its successors and assigns." 
Approximately five months before the creation of the Note and DOT, on April 10, 
2006, GreenPoint entered into a Flow Interim Servicing Agreement ("FISA") (Exhibit D)1 
with Lehman Capital, a division of Lehman Brothers Holdings, Inc. (collectively 
"Lehman"), pursuant to which Lehman agreed to purchase conventional, residential, 
fixed and adjustable rate first and second lien mortgage loans from GreenPoint. Under 
the FISA, GreenPoint agreed to service the mortgage loans it sold to Lehman. 
According to GMAC, GreenPoint transferred the Note and DOT to Lehman under the 
FISA. 
On November 1,2006, Lehman entered into a Mortgage Loan Sale and 
Assignment Agreement ("MLSAA") with Structured Asset Securities Corporation 
("SASC) (Exhibit E). Under that agreement, Lehman transferred a number of the 
mortgage loans it acquired under the FISA to SASC. GMAC claims that the Note was 
one of the mortgage loans transferred to SASC. SASC created a trust to hold the 
transferred mortgages—GreenPoint Mortgage Funding Trust ("Trust"). The MLSAA 
1
 Exhibits refer to the exhibits admitted into evidence at a November 10, 2009 evidentiary 
hearing. 
also transferred the right to receive principal and interest payments under the 
transferred mortgage loans from Lehman to the Trust. 
Also, on November 1, 2006, SASC entered into a Trust Agreement (Exhibit F) 
with Aurora Loan Services ("Aurora'') as the master servicer, and U.S. Bank National 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 i Association ("U.S. Bank") as the trustee. A Reconstituted Servicing Agreement 
7 I (Exhibit G) was executed the same day, which provided that GreenPoint would continue 
8 
9 
10 
11 
121 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
to service the mortgages transferred to the Trust under the MLSAA, but that the Trust 
could change servicers at any time. Also, according to GMAC, on November 1,2006, 
GMAC, Lehman, and Aurora entered into a Securitization Servicing Agreement ("SSA") 
| (Exhibit H), pursuant to which GMAC would service the loans transferred to the Trust. 
GMAC claims that under the SSA it is the current servicer of the Note and DOT. 
Thus, according to GMAC, as of November 1,2006, the Note and DOT had been 
transferred to the Trust, with SASC as the Trustor, U.S. Bank as the Trustee, Aurora as 
the master servicer, and GMAC as the sub-servicer. GreenPoint went out of business 
in 2007. According to GMAC, it remains the sub-servicer of the Note, and that is its only 
financial interest in the Note and DOT. (Transcript Nov. 10,2009, pp. 44,47, 75.) 
201 B. Bankruptcy Events 
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As of March 1, 2009, the Debtor was in default of his obligations under the Note. 
Debtor filed his petition for relief under Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code on March 19, 
I 2009. On May 16, 2009, GMAC filed a proof of claim ("POO"), which attached the Note 
and DOT. The Endorsement from GreenPoint to GMAC was not attached to GMAC's 
proof of claim. On May 12, 2009, MERS, as nominee for GreenPoint, assigned its 
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interest in the DOT to GMAC ("MERS Assignmenf). The MERS Assignment was 
recorded on Juiy 16, 2009. 
GMAC filed a Motion for Relief from Stay ("Motion") on May 29,2009, on the 
grounds that the Debtor had no equity in the Property and the Property was not 
necessary for an effective reorganization. The Motion also requested adequate 
protection payments to protect GMAC's alleged interest in the Property. GMAC 
attached the Note with the Endorsement and DOT as exhibits to the Motion. 
The Debtor filed a response challenging GMAC's standing to seek relief from 
stay. After various discovery disputes, GMAC sent a letter dated September 17, 2009, 
to the Debtor which purported to explain the various transfers of the Note and the DOT. 
(Docket #90). The letter explained that GreenPoint transferred the "subject loan" to 
Lehman under the FISA, that Lehman sold the "subject loan" to SASC under the 
MLSAA, that SASC, Aurora Loan Services, and U.S. National Bank entered into a trust 
agreement, which created the Trust and made Aurora the master servicer for the 
"subject loan," and, that GMAC was the servicer of the "subject loan" under the SSA. 
| According to GMAC, its status as servicer, along with the Endorsement of the Note to 
GMAC and the assignment of the DOT from MERS to GMAC, demonstrated that it had 
standing to bring the Motion. 
On November 10,2009, the Court conducted an evidentiary hearing on the 
Motion. GMAC offered the original Note at the hearing snd admitted into evidence a 
copy of the Note, DOT, copies of the FISA, MLSAA, Trust Agreement, the Reconstituted 
Servicing Agreement and the SSA. However, GMAC did not offer any documents 
demonstrating how the Note and DOT were conveyed by GreenPoint to the FISA. No 
4 
I 
1 document was offered demonstrating how the Note and DOT were conveyed from the 
2
 1 FiSA to the MLSAA or from the MLSAA into the Trust. Schedule A-1 of the MLSAA, 
3 „ 
where the transferred mortgages presumably would have been listed, only has the 
4 I 
\ words intentionally Omitted" on it, and Schedule A-2 has the word "None." (Exhibit F, 
6 | pp. 19-20). Similarly, there is no evidence that the Note and DOT are subject to the 
7 I SSA. Exhibit A to the SSA, titled "Mortgage Loan Schedule," is blank. At the 
8
 | conclusion of the hearing, this Court ordered the Debtor to begin making adequate 
protection payments commencing on December 1, 2009 to the Chapter 13 Trustee. 
The Court further ordered GMAC and the Debtor to negotiate the amount of the 
adequate protection payments. When the parties were unable to reach agreement, the 
Court set the amount of the monthly payments at $1,000. 
HI. ISSUE 
Does GMAC have standing to bring the Motion? 
rV. JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Jurisdiction is proper under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1334(a) and 157(b)(2)(G). 
V. DISCUSSION 
A. Introduction 
Section 362(a) of the Bankruptcy Code provides that the filing of a bankruptcy 
petition operates as a stay of collection and enforcement actions. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a). 
The purpose of the automatic stay is to provide debtors with "protection against hungry 
creditors" and to assure creditors that the debtor's other creditors are not "rscing to 
various courthouses to pursue independent remedies to drain the debtor's assets." 
In re Tippett, 542 F.3d 684, 689-80 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing Dean v. Tmns World Airlines, 
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6 111 U.S.C. § 362(d)(1). The court may grant relief "for cause, including the lack of 
7 I adequate protection." Id. The court may also grant relief from the stay with respect to 
Inc., 72 F.3d 754, 755-56 (9th Cir. 1995)); see also In re Johnston, 321 B.R. 262, 273-
74 (D. Ariz. 2005). Despite the broad protection the stay affords, it is not without limits. 
Section 362(d) allows the court, upon request of a "party in interest," to grant relief from 
the stay, "such as terminating, annulling, modifying, or conditioning such stay." 
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13 I Matter of Brown Transp. Truckload, Inc., 118 B.R. 889, 893 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1990); In 
14 I re Vieland, 41 B.R. 134,138 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1984)). Relief from stay hearings are 
specific property of the estate if the debtor lacks equity in the property and the property 
is not necessary to an effective reorganization. 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(2). 
Any party affected by the stay should be entitled to seek relief. 3 COLLIER'S ON 
BANKRUPTCY If 362.07[2] (Henry Somers & Alan Resnick, eds. 15th ed., rev. 2009); 
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limited in scope—the validity of underlying claims is not litigated. In re Johnson, 
756 F.2d 738, 740 (9th Cir. 1985). As one court has noted, B[s]tay relief hearings do not 
involve a full adjudication on the merits of claims, defenses or counterclaims, but simply 
a determination as to whether a creditor has a colorable claim." In re Emrich, 2009 
WL 3816174, at *1 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 2009). 
Nevertheless, in order to establish a colorable claim, e movent for relief from stay 
bears the burden of proof that it has standing to bring the motion. In re Wilhelm, 
407 B.R. 392,400 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2009). The issue of standing involves both 
"constitutional limitations on federal court jurisdiction and prudential limitations on its 
exercise." Werth v. Seldin, All U.S. 490, 498 (1975). Constitutional standing concerns 
whetner the plaintiffs personal stake in the lawsuit is sufficient to hs.ve a "case or 
6 
controversy" to which the federal judicial power may extend under Article III. Id.; see 
also Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 558-60 (1992); Pershing Park Villas 
Homeowners Ass'n v. UnitedPac. Ins. Co., 219 F.3d 895, 699 (9th Cir. 2000). 
Additionally, the "prudential doctrine of standing has come to encompass several 
6 f judicially self-imposed limits on the exercise of federal jurisdiction.'" Pershing Park 
7 I Villas, 219 F.3d at 899. Such limits are the prohibition on third-party standing and the 
8
 | requirement that suits be maintained by the real party in interest. See Warth v. Seldin, 
9
 1422 U.S. at 498-99; Gilmartin v. City of Tucson, 2006 WL 5917165, at *4 (D. Ariz. of 
12006). Thus, prudential standing requires the plaintiff to assert its own claims rather 
I than the claims of another. The requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 17, made applicable in 
13 | stay relief motions by Rule 9014, "generally falls within the prudential standing doctrine." 
14 J In re Wilhelm, 407 B. R. at 398. 
B. GMAC's Standing 
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1. GMAC Has Not Demonstrated That It Is A Hoider Of The Note 
If GMAC is the holder of the Note, GMAC would be a party injured by the 
Debtor's failure to pay it, thereby satisfying the constitutional standing requirement. 
GMAC would also be the real party in interest under Fed. R. Civ. P. 17 because under 
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ("A.R.S.') § 47-3301, the holder of a note has the right to enforce it.2 
However, as discussed below, GMAC did not prove it is the holder of the Note. 
Under Arizona law, a holder is defined as "the person in possession of a 
negotiable instrument that is payable either to bearer or to an identified person that is 
the person in possession." A.R.S. § 47-1201 (B)(21)(a).3 GMAC has 
failed to demonstrate that it is the hoider of the Note because, while it was in 
possession of the Note at the evidentiary hearing, it failed to demonstrate that the Note 
is properly payable to GMAC. A special endorsement to GMAC was admitted into 
evidence with the Note. However, for the Endorsement to constitute part of the Note, it 
must be on "a paper affixed to the instrument.'' A.R.S. § 47-3204; see also In re Nash, 
49 B.R. 254, 261 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1985). Here, the evidence did not demonstrate that 
the Endorsement was affixed to the Note. The Endorsement is on a separate sheet of 
paper; there was no evidence that it was stapled or otherwise attached to the rest of the 
2
 Because there is no federal commercial law which defines who is a note holder, the court 
must look to Arizona law to determine if GMAC is a holder. In re Montagne, 421 B.R. 65, 73 
(Bankr. D. Vt. 2009) ("Bankruptcy law does not generally provide for the enforcement of 
| promissory notes. As a result, the legal obligations of the parties are determined by applicable 
non-bankruptcy law, which is usually state law."). 
3
 Arizona substantially adopted the 1972 revised, version of the Uniform Commercial Code 
CUeC") in 1975. See Fin. Mgmt. Servs., Inc. v. Familian Corp., 183 Ariz. 497,499 n.1 (Ct. App. 
1995); Wollenberg v. Phoenix Leasing Inc., 182 Ariz. 4, 7 n. 2 (Ct. App. 1994). In 1993, 
Arizona adopted the 1990 revision of UCC Article 3. Fin. Mgmt. Servs., Inc., 183 Ariz, at 502 
n.2. 
1 I Note. Furthermore, when GMAC filed its proof of claim, the Endorsement was not 
2
 I included, which is a further indication that the allonge containing the Endorsement was 
3 I 
| not affixed to the Note.4 
4 j 
I In Adams v. Madison Realty & Dev., Inc., 853 F.2d 163 (3d Cir. 1988), the 
5 
6 I plaintiffs executed promissory notes which, after a series of transfers, came into the 
7 | defendant's possession. At issue was whether the defendant was the rightful owner of 
8
 I the notes. The court held that the defendant was not entitled to holder in due course 
status because the endorsements failed to meet the UCC's fixation requirement. Id. at 
168-69. The court relied on UCC section 3-202(2) [A.R.S. §47-3204]: "An indorsement 
must be written by or on behalf of the holder and on the instrument or on a paper so 
firmly affixed thereto as to become a part thereof." Id. at 165. Since the endorsement 
page, indicating that the. defendant was the holder of the note, was not attached to the 
note, the court found that the note had not been properly negotiated. Id. at 166-67. 
Thus, ownership of the note never transferred to the defendant. Applying that principle 
to the facts here, GMAC did not become a holder of the Note due to the improperly 
affixed special endorsement. 
20 | While the bankruptcy court in In re Nash, 49 B.R. 254 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1985) 
21 I found that holder in due course status existed even though an allonge was not properly 
2 2
 | affixed to an instrument, the court based its determination on the clear intention thst the 
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 The special endorsement to GMAC is also completely inconsistent with the securitization of 
the note into the Trust which GMAC asserts occurred shortly after it was executed by the 
Debtor. According to GMAC, the Note and DOT were conveyed by GreenPoint to Lehman and 
ultimately to a Trust. But if the Note was endorsed to GMAC, GreenPoint would not have been 
able to convey the Note—only GMAC as the holder of the note could have conveyed it 
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note assignment be physically attached because: (1) the assignment was signed and 
notarized the same day as the trust deed; (2) the assignment specifically referenced the 
escrow number; (3) the assignment identified the original note holder; and (4) the 
assignment recited that the note was to be attached to the assignment. Id. at 261. 
In this case, however, there is no proof that the allonge containing the special 
endorsement from GreenPoint to GMAC was executed at or near the time the Note was 
executed. Furthermore, the Endorsement does not have any identifying numbers on it, 
such as an account number or an escrow number, nor does it reference the Note in any 
way. There is simply no indication that the allonge was appropriately affixed to the 
Note, in contradiction with the mandates of A.R.S. § 47-3204. Thus, there is no basis in 
this case to depart from the general rule that an endorsement on an allonge must be 
affixed to the instrument to be valid. 
GMAC cannot overcome the problems with the unaffixed Endorsement by its 
physical possession of the Note because the Note was not endorsed in blank and, even 
if it was, the problem of the unaffixed endorsement would remain.5 As a result, because 
GMAC failed to meet its burden of demonstrating that the Endorsement was proper, it 
has failed to demonstrate that it is the holder of the Note. 
15
 If the Note was endorsed in blank (and the Endorsement was properly affixed to the Note), it 
would be a bearer instrument and, therefore, enforceable by the parry in physical possession. 
See In re Hill, 2009 WL 1956174, *2 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 2009). 
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2. The MERS Assignment Of The DOT Did Not Provide GMAC With 
Standing 
GMAC argues that it has standing to bring the Motion as the assignee of MERS.6 
In this case, MERS is named in the DOT as a beneficiary, solely as the "nominee" of 
GreenPoint, holding only "legal title" to the interests granted to GreenPoint under the 
DOT. A number of cases have held that such language confers no economic benefit on 
MERS. See, e.g., In re Sheridan, 2009 WL 631355, *4 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2009); In re 
Mitchell, 2009 WL 1044368, *3-4 (Bankr. D. Nev. 2009); In re Jacobson, 402 B.R. 359, 
367 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. 2009). As noted by the Sheridan court, MERS "collects] no 
money from [djebtors under the [njote, nor will it realize the value of the [property 
through foreclosure of the [d]eed of [tjrust in the event the [n]ote is not paid." 2009 WL 
I 631355 at *4. 
Because MERS has no financial interest in the Note, it will suffer no injury if the 
Note is not paid and will realize no benefit if the DOT is foreclosed. Accordingly, MERS 
17 | cannot satisfy the requirements of constitutional standing. GMAC, as MERS' assignee 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
M 
15 
,6 
7 
8 
of the DOT, "stands in the shoes" of the assignor, taking only those rights and remedies 
the assignor would have had. Hunnicutt Constr., Inc. v. Stewart Title & Trust of Tucson, 
Trust No. 3496,187 Ariz. 301, 304 (Ct. App. 1996) citing Van Waters & Rogers v. 
Interchange Res., Inc., 14 Ariz. App. 414,417 (1971); In re Boyajian, 367 B.R. 138,145 
6
 MERS' primary function is to act as a document custodian. Major players in the mortgage 
lending industry created MERS to simplify the process of transfening mortgages by avoiding the 
need to re-record liens—and pay court recorder filing fees—each time it is assigned. 
Christopher L. Peterson, Predatory Structured Finance, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 2185, 2266-67 
(2007). 
11 
(9th Cir. BAP 2007). Because GMAC is MERS' assignee, it cannot satisfy the 
requirements of constitutional standing either.7 
3. GMAC Does Not Have Standing As The Servicer Of The Note 
(a) Servicer's Right To Collect Fees For Securitized Mortgages 
Securitization of residential mortgages is "the process of aggregating a 
7 | large number of notes secured by deeds of trust in what is called a mortgage pool, and 
8
 I then selling security interests in that pool of mortgages." Kurt Eggert, Held Up In Due 
9 I 
J Course: Predatory Lending, Securitization, and the Holder in Due Course Doctrine, 01 
fi 35 CREIGHTON L. REV. 503, 536 (2002). The process begins with a borrower negotiating 11 I 
j with a mortgage broker for the terms of the loan. Then, the mortgage broker either 
13 | originates the loan in its own name or in the name of another entity, which presumably 
14 I provides the money for the loan. Almost immediately, the broker transfers the loan to 
J5
 1 the funding entity. "This lender quickly sells the loan to a different financial entity, which 
• pools the loan together with a host of other loans in a mortgage pool." id. at 538. 17 
18 
19 
20 J 7 The Arizona District Court has rer^ nfiw h«w *u *.«-«« 
21 of trust, oould appoint a t^SS^riSSSiSSSi' T 1 beneficiary u n d e r • * " 
>2 I 2trt,f,cates' Series2006-5,2009 WL482701fiS7A2T SSKF J ? ^ ' Bac^ Pass-Through 
-
2
 I WL 3174823 (D. Ariz. 2009) Those, * 2 ~ 1 ( A n i 2 0 0 9 ) ; *«w * An.'« Se/v. Co 2009 
«foreclosure sale can be c S u S X S M S ^ ' fo?T d 0 n w h e t h e r a nonjudicial 
presentation of the original n S T r f i S S ^ Z ^ J ^ f ^ Statu'e " » « * 
conducted under Arizona's deed of t rust r t r i f fZ^f non• ju?'c,a, foreclosures may be 
however, that does not resolve the issul of ^ 1 Ut presfrtation <* * e original note; 
Furthermore, while A t t a ^ ^ S ^ i j ! ^ m* motion for relief from stay. ' 
* . note, a deed of trust s e c u ^ »!**** of 
Therefore, a non-judicial foreclosure K o n d S S ? f *?tUnder AR"S- § 33-801(8). 
and, the party conducting e u c h ^ te22S2£ S f " ? *? , S M B o f t h e « » * * * "older 
fl holders agent. s sa|e is presumably either the holder of the contract or the 
>3 
54 
15 
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The assignee then transfers the mortgages in the pool to another entity, 
which in turn transfers the loans to a special purpose vehicle ("SPV",) whose sole role is 
to hold the pool of mortgages. Id, at 539. "The transfer to the special purpose trust 
must constitute a true sale, so that the party transferring the assets reduces its potential 
liability on the loans and exchanges the fairly illiquid loans for much more liquid cash." 
Id. at 542. Next, the SPV issues securities which the assignee sells to investors. Id. at 
539. 
Once the securities have been sold, the SPV is not actively involved. It 
"does not directly collect payments from the homeowners whose notes and deeds of 
| trust are held by the SPV." Id. at 544. Rather, servicers collect the principal and 
interest payments on behalf of the SPV. Id. Fees are associated with the servicing of 
loans in the pool. Therefore, GMAC would have constitutional standing if it is the 
servicer for the Note and DOT because it would suffer concrete injury by not being able 
to collect its servicing fees.8 In re O'Kelley, 420 B.R. 18, 23 (D. Haw. 2009). In this 
case, however, the evidence does not demonstrate that the Note and DOT were 
transferred to the Trust, and, without that evidence, there is no demonstration that 
GMAC is the servicer of the Note. 
8
 Even if a servicer has constitutional standing, it may still not be the "real party in interesf 
under Fed. R. Civ. P. 17 and may not, therefore, be able to satisfy the requirements for 
prudential standing. See, e.g., In re Jacobson, 402 B.R. 359, 365-66 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. 
2009); In re Hwang, 396 B.R. 757, 767 (Bankr. CD. Cal. 2008). 
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(b) There Is Insufficient Evidence That The Note Was Sold To Lehman 
And Became Part Of The Trust 
When the Debtor executed the Note and DOT, GreenPoint was the 
original holder of the Note and the economic beneficiary of the DOT. GreenPoint, 
allegedly, transferred the Note to Lehman pursuant to the FISA. However, the term 
"mortgage loans" is not defined in the FISA and GMAC's documents regarding the 
securitization of the Note and DOT provide no evidence of actual transfers of the Note 
and DOT to either the FISA or the Trust. Because such transfers must be "true sales," 
• they must be properly documented to be effective. Thus, to use an overused term, 
GMAC has failed "to connect the dots" to demonstrate that the Note and DOT were 
securitized. Accordingly, it is immaterial that GMAC is the servicer for the Trust. 
C. Debtor's Other Arguments 
1. Securities Investors Are Not The Only Individuals Who Can Satisfy 
Standing Requirements When Dealing With A 362 Motion on a 
"Securitized" Mortgage 
The Debtor argues that, in an asset securitization scheme, only the securities 
investors have standing to seek stay relief because they are the only parties with a 
financial interest in the securitized notes. However, because the Debtor executed the 
Note and received consideration (which he used to purchase the house), the contract 
is enforceable regardless of who provided the funding. In other words, the fact that the 
funds for a borrower's loan are supplied by someone other than the loan originator, 
does not invalidate the loan or restrict enforcement of the loan contract to the parties 
who funded the loan. A number of cases and treatises recognize that consideration for 
a contract, including a promissory note, can be provided by a third party. See, e.g., 
14 
DCMLtd. P'ship v. Wang, 555 F. Supp. 2d 808, 817 (E.D. Mich. 2008); Buffalo County 
v. Richards, 212 Neb. 826, 828-29 (Neb. 1982); 3 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 7:20 
(Richard A. Lord, 4th ed. 2009); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 71(4) 
(2009). 
Notes are regularly assigned and the assignment does not change the nature of 
the contract. The assignee merely steps into the shoes of the assignor. In re Boyajian, 
367 B.R. 138,145 (9th Cir. BAP 2007); In re Trejos, 374 B.R. 210, 215 (9th Cir. BAP 
2007). No additional consideration is required, as opposed to a novation which creates 
a new obligation. Id. at 216-17 citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 280, 
cmt. e. Therefore, the Debtor's argument that the Note is unenforceable because the 
funder of the Note was not the payee fails. The Note is still valid and can be enforced 
by the party who has the right to enforce it under applicable Arizona law. 
2. Proof Of A Note's Entire Chain Of Ownership Is Not Necessary For Stay 
Relief 
A movant for stay relief need only present evidence sufficient to present a 
colorable claim—not every piece of evidence that would be required to prove the right 
to foreclose under a state law judicial foreclosure proceeding is necessary. In re 
Emhch, 2009 WL 3816174, at*1 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 2009). Accordingly, not every 
movant for relief from stay has to provide e complete chain of a note's assignment to 
obtain relief. 
Arizona's deed of trust statute does not require a beneficiary of a deed of trust 
to produce the underlying note (or its chain of assignment) in order to conduct a 
Trustee's Sale. Blau v. Am.'s Serv. Co., 2009 WL 3174823, at *6 (D. Ariz. 2009); 
15 
1 1 Mansourv. Cal~W. Reconveyance Corp,, 618 F. Supp. 2d 1178, 1181 (D. Ariz. 2009); 
2 l!
 Diessner v. Mortg. Bee. Registration Sys., 618 F. Supp. 2d 1184,1187 (D. Ariz. 2009). 
3 " 
It would make no sense to require a creditor to demonstrate more to obtain stay relief 
| than it needs to demonstrate under state law to conduct a judicial or non-judicial 
6 foreclosure. Moreover, if a note is endorsed in blank, it is enforceable as a bearer 
7 I instrument. See in re Hill, 2009 WL 1956174, at *2 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 2009). Therefore, 
8
 this Court declines to impose a blanket requirement that all movants must offer proof of 
9 0 
a note's entire chain of assignments to have standing to seek relief although there may 
10 
be circumstances where, in order to establish standing, the movant will have to do so. 
11 J 
_ I 3. The Movant Has Not Violated Rule 9011 
12 J 
13 K The Debtor argues that GMAC "violated Rule 7011" by presenting insufficient 
14 and misleading evidence. Given that there is no Rule 7011, the Court assumes that 
15
 A the Debtor was actually referring to Bankruptcy Rule 9011. Rule 9011 allows a court to 
\(\ II 
I impose sanctions for filing a frivolous suit. FED. R. BANKR. P. 9011 (c); see also FED. R. 
17 I 
0 Civ. P. 1 1(C). AS noted at the evidentiary hearing, the Court did not find that GMAC 
18
 B 
Q „ filed its motion for relief stay in bad faith, nor does this Court believe GMAC filed its 
20 | motion thinking it did not have proper evidentiary support. There are numerous, often 
21 conflicting, decisions on the issues of "real party in interesf and constitutional standing, 
2 2
 | and what evidence must be presented by a servicer seeking stay relief. The record in 
23 „ 
this case does not support imposition of 9011 sanctions. 
24" 
25 
26 
27 
28 II 16 
VI. CONCLUSION 
GMAC has not demonstrated that it has constitutional or prudential standing 
is the real party in interest entitled to prosecute a motion for relief from stay. 
Accordingly, its motion Is DENIED without prejudice. 
Dated and signed above. 
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Bankruptcy Noticing Center "BNC" 
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5424 East Placita Apan 
Tucson, AZ 85718 
Ronald Ryan 
Ronald Ryan, P.C. 
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Dianne C. Kerns 
Chapter 13 Trustee 
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GMAC Mortgage 
c/o Pite Duncan, LLP 
4375 Jutland Drive, Suite 200 
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
DISTRICT OF NEVADA 
MORTGAGE ELECTRONIC 
REGISTRATION SYSTEMS, INC., 
Appellant, 
LISA MARIE CHONG, LENARD E. 
SCHWARTZER, BANKRUPTCY 
TRUSTEE, etal, 
Appellees. 
Dist. Ct. Case No. 2:09-CV-00661-KJD-LRL 
Bankr. Ct. Case No. BK-S-07-16645-LBR 
ORDER 
Presently before the Court is Appellant's Appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 158(a) from the 
Bankruptcy Court's Order Denying Motion to Lift Stay entered in the Adversary Proceeding No. BK-
S-07-16645-LBR, docket no. 49, March 31, 2009. Having considered the briefs and the record on 
appeal, including the arguments of parties at the consolidated hearing on November 10, 2009, the 
Court affirms the Order of the Bankruptcy Court. 
I. Procedural History and Facts 
On April 14, 2009, Appellant Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. ("MERS") filed 
Notice of Appeal (#1) appealing the Bankruptcy Court's order denying Appellant's motion for relief 
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from stay. This appeal is one of approximately eighteen (18) similar cases in which the Bankruptcy 
Court ruled that Appellant lacked standing to bring the motion. 
Li the underlying bankruptcy action, MERS filed its Motion for Relief from Stay ("the 
Motion") pursuant to Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Practice ("Rule") 4001 on January 14, 2008 
seeking to have the automatic stay lifted so that MERS could conduct a non-judicial foreclosure sale 
on debtor's real property because the debtor lacked the ability to make payments and could not 
provide adequate security. Trustee Lenard E. Schwartzer ("Trustee") filed objections to the Motion 
claiming that MERS did not have standing as a real party in interest under the Rules to file the 
motion. (Appellant's Appendix ("Appx.") Doc. No. 12, p. 34). In response, Appellant filed the 
Declaration of Faatima Straggans, an employee of Homecomings Financial, LLC the authorized 
servicing agent for MERS, attempting to authenticate a copy of the original Deed of Trust ("Deed") 
and Note. (Appx. 36-38). The Deed described MERS as beneficiary and identified MERS as the 
nominee of the original lender, FMC Capital LLC. Id. However, the Declaration identified neither 
the current owner of the beneficial interest in the Note, nor any of the successors or assignees of the 
Deed of Trust. The Declaration also failed to assert that MERS, FMC Capital LLC or Homecomings 
Financial, LLC held the Note. 
Due to the similar issues raised regarding motions for relief from stay in approximately 
twenty-seven (27) cases involving MERS, the Bankruptcy Court set a joint hearing for all twenty-
seven cases. (Appx. 113-18). The Bankruptcy Court also ordered consolidated briefing for all cases 
to be filed in Case No. 07-16226-LBR, In re Mitchell, the "lead case". Id. In a majority of the cases, 
including the present case, Appellant attempted to withdraw the Motion but was procedurally unable 
to do so, because the Trustee would not consent. (Appx. 1383, 1902-1904, 1907-1909). MERS 
informed the Bankruptcy Court that it had attempted to withdraw the Motion, because it had been 
filed contrary to its own corporate procedures. (Appx. 432). Particularly in this case, MERS was 
unable to show that a MERS Certifying Officer was in physical possession of the Note at the time the 
Motion was filed. (Appx. 624). 
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A final hearing was held on August 19, 2008. (Appx. 650-729). On March 31, 2009, the 
Bankruptcy Court issued Memorandum Opinions and Orders denying MERS' motions for relief from 
stay in Mitchell and two other cases. (Appx. 740-54, 1581-95,1959-72). In the remaining cases, 
including the present case, the Bankruptcy Court denied the motions for relief from stay by 
incorporating the reasoning from the Mitchell Memorandum Opinion. (Appx.46). • 
The Bankruptcy Court held that MERS lacked standing because it was not a real party in 
interest as required by the Rules. (Appx. 740-54). Specifically, the court found that "[w]hile MERS 
may have standing to prosecute the motion in the name of its Member as nominee, there is no 
evidence that the named nominee is entitled to enforce the note or that MERS is the agent of the 
note's holder." (Appx. 753). The court further held that MERS' asserted interest as beneficiary 
under the contract terms did not confer standing because MERS had no actual beneficial interest in 
the note and, therefore, was not a beneficiary. (Appx. 745-48). 
MERS now appeals that order asserting that the Bankruptcy Court erred as a matter of law 
when it determined that MERS may not be a beneficiary under the deeds of trust at issue in the 
eighteen consolidated cases where the express language of the deeds of trust provide that MERS is 
the beneficiary. The Trustee continues to assert that MERS lacks standing because it is not a real 
party in interest. 
II. Standard of Review 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 158(a) and reviews the Bankruptcy 
Court's findings under the same standard that the court of appeals would review a district court's 
findings in a civil matter. 28 U.S.C. § 158(c)(2). Therefore, the Court reviews the Bankruptcy 
Court's factual findings under a clearly erroneous standard, and conclusions of law de novo. See In 
re Healthcentral.com, 504 F.3d 775, 783 (9th Cir. 2007); In re First Magnus Fin. Corp., 403 B.R. 
659, 663 (D. Ariz. 2009). 
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HI. Analysis 
This appeal arises from eighteen cases in which MERS filed motions for relief from stay in 
the Bankruptcy Court. In each case, either a party or the Bankruptcy Court raised the issue of 
whether MERS had standing to bring the motion. In holding that MERS did not have standing as the 
real party in interest to bring the motion for relief from stay, the Bankruptcy Court determined that 
MERS was not a beneficiary in spite of language that designated MERS as such in the Deed of Trust 
at issue. MERS seeks to overturn the Bankruptcy Court's determination that it is not a beneficiary. 
However, the Court must affirm the Bankruptcy Court's order under the facts presented because 
MERS failed to present sufficient evidence demonstrating that it is a real party in interest. 
A motion for relief from stay is a contested matter under the Bankruptcy Code. See Fed. R. 
Bankr. P. 4001(a); 9014(c). Bankruptcy Rule 7017 applies in contested matters. Rule 7017 
incorporates Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 17(a)(1) which requires that "[a]n action must be 
prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest." See also, In re Jacobson, 402 B.R. 359, 365-66 
(Bankr. W.D. Wash. 2009); In re Hwang, 396 B.R. 757, 766-67 (Bankr. CD. Cal. 2008). Thus, 
while MERS argues the bankruptcy court erred when it determined that MERS was not a beneficiary 
under the deeds of trust, MERS only has standing in the context of the motion to lift stay under the 
Rules if it is the real party in interest. See Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7017. 
Since MERS admits that it does not actually receive or forfeit money when borrowers fail to 
make their payments, MERS must at least provide evidence of its alleged agency relationship with 
the real party in interest in order to have standing to seek relief from stay. See Jacobson, 402 B.R. at 
366, n.7 (quoting Hwang, 396 B.R. at 767 ("the right to enforce a note on behalf of a noteholder does 
not convert the noteholder's agent into a real party in interest")). An agent for the purpose of 
bringing suit is "viewed as a nominal rather than a real party in interest and will be required to 
litigate in the name of his principal rather than his own name." Hwang, 396 B.R. at 767. This is 
particularly important in the District of Nevada where the Local Rules of Bankruptcy Practice require 
parties to communicate in good faith regarding resolution of a motion for relief from stay before it is 
Case2:09-cv-00661-KJD-LRL Document 52 Filed 12/04/09 Page 5 of 6 
filed. LR 4001(a)(3). The parties cannot come to a resolution if those with a beneficial interest in 
the note have not been identified and engaged in the communication. 
In the context of a motion for relief from stay, the movant, MERS in this case, bears the 
burden of proving it is a real party in interest. In re Wilhelm, 407 B.R. 392, 400 (Bankr. D. Idaho 
2009)(citing In re Hayes, 393 B.R. 259, 267 (Bankr. D.Mass. 2008)('To have standing to seek relief 
from the automatic stay, [movant] was required to establish that it is a party in interest and that its 
rights are not those of another entity5')). Initially, a movant seeking relief from stay may rely upon its 
motion. Id. However, if a trustee or debtor objects based upon standing, the movant must come 
forward with evidence of standing. Id.; Jacobson, 402 B.R. at 367 (requiring movant at least 
demonstrate who presently holds the note at issue or the source of movant's authority). 
Instead of presenting the evidence to the Bankruptcy Court, MERS attempted to withdraw the 
Motion from the Bankruptcy Court's consideration, citing the failure of a MERS Certifying Officer 
to demonstrate that a member was in physical possession of the promissory note at the time the 
motion was filed.1 The only evidence provided by MERS was a declaration that MERS had been 
identified as a beneficiary in the deed of trust and that it had been named nominee for the original 
lender. Since MERS provided no evidence that it was the agent or nominee for the current owner of 
the beneficial interest in the note, it has failed to meet its burden of establishing that it is a real party 
in interest with standing. Accordingly, the order of the Bankruptcy Court must be affirmed. 
This holding is limited to the specific facts and procedural posture of the instant case. Since 
the Bankruptcy Court denied the Motion without prejudice nothing prevents Appellant from refiling 
the Motion in Bankruptcy Court providing the evidence it admits should be readily available in its 
system. The Court makes no finding that MERS would not be able to establish itself as a real party 
in interest had it identified the holder of the note or provided sufficient evidence of the source of its 
authority. 
lJn other cases movant did not seek to withdraw the Motion, but similarly produced no 
evidence that it held the note or acted as the agent of the noteholder. 
5 
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1 IV. Conclusion 
2 Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Order of the Bankruptcy Court entered 
3 March 31, 2009 is AFFIRMED. 
4 I DATED this 4th day of December 2009. 
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7 [.' " ' 
Kent J. Dawson 
8 II United States District Judge 
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EXHIBIT 
"C" 
UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT 
EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 
CIVIL MINUTES 
Case Title: 
Matter: 
Judge: 
Courtroom Deputy: 
Reporter: 
Department: 
APPEARANCES for: 
Movant(s) : 
Debtor(s) Attorney - Mitchell L. Abdallah 
Respondents): 
None 
OBJECTION was: 
Sustained 
See Findings of fact and conclusions of law below 
The court will issue a minute order. 
Local Rule 3007-1 (c)(1) Motion - No Opposition Filed. 
Proper Notice Provided. The Proof of Service filed on April 6,2010, states that the Motion and supporting 
pleadings were served on respondent creditor, other parties in interest and Office of the United States 
Trustee. 
The court notes that the moving party filed the declaration and exhibits in this matter as one document This 
is not the practice in the Bankruptcy Court. "Motions, notices, objections, responses, replies, declarations, 
affidavits, other documentary evidence, memoranda of points and authorities, other supporting documents, 
proofs of service, and related pleadings shall be filed as separate documents." Revised Guidelines for the 
Preparation of Documents, paragraph(3)(a). Counsel is reminded of the court's expectation that documents 
filed with this court comply with the Revised Guidelines for the Preparation of Documents in Appendix II of 
the Local Rules and that attorneys practicing in federal court comply with the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure and the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure. 
NOTICE 
FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH THE GUIDELINES AND 
FILING PLEADINGS WHICH DO NOT COMPLY WITH THE 
FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE SHALL RESULT 
IN THE MOTION BEING SUMMARILY DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. 
This Objection to a Proof of Claim has been set for hearing on the notice required by Local Bankruptcy 
Rule 3007- 1(c)(1). The failure of the Trustee and the respondent creditor to file written opposition at least 
14 days prior to the hearing as required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 3007-1(c)(1)(l) is considered as consent 
to the granting of the motion. Cf. Ghazali v. Moran, 46 F.3d 52, 53 (9th Cir. 1995). 
The court's decision is to sustain the Objection to the Proof of Claim and disallow the claim in its entirety 
with leave for the owner of the promissory note to file a claim by June 18,2010. Oral argument may be 
Rickie Walker Case No ; 10-21656 - E - 11 
Date: 5/20/10 
Time: 10:30 
[52] - Objection to Claim of Citibank, N.A., 
Claim Number 5 [MLA-3] Filed by Debtor In 
Possession Rickie Walker (npas) 
Ronald H. Sargis 
Janet Larson 
Diamond Reporters 
resented by the parties at the scheduled hearing, where the parties shall address the issues identified in 
this tentative ruling and such other issues as are necessary and appropriate to the court's resolution of the 
matter. If the court's tentative ruling becomes its final ruling, the court will make the following findings of fact 
and conclusions of law: 
The Proof of Claim at issue, listed as claim number 5 on the court's official claims registry, asserts a 
$1,320,650.52 secured claim. The Debtor objects to the Claim on the basis that the claimant, Citibank, 
N.A., did not provided any evidence that Citibank has the authority to bring the claim, as required by 
Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 3001(c), rendering the claim facially defective. 
The court's review of the claim shows that the Deed of Trust purports to have been assigned to Citibank, 
N.A. by Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. as nominee for Bayrock Mortgage Corporation on 
March 5,2010. (Proof of Claim No. 5 p.36-37, Mar. 19,2010.) Debtor contends that this does not establish 
that Citibank is the owner of the underling promissory note since the assignor, Mortgage Electronic 
Registration Systems, Inc. ("MERS"), had no interest in the note to transfer. Debtors loan was originated by 
Bayrock Mortgage Corporation and no evidence of the current owner of the promissory note is attached to 
the proof of claim. It is well established law in the Ninth Circuit that the assignment of a trust deed does not 
assign the underlying promissory note and right to be paid, and that the security interest is incident of the 
debt. 4 Witkin Summary of California Law, Secured Transactions in Real Property §105 (10th ed). 
MERS AND CITIBANK ARE NOT THE REAL PARTIES IN INTEREST 
Under California law, to perfect the transfer of mortgage paper as collateral the owner should physically 
deliver the note to the transferee. Bear v. Golden Plan of California, Inc., 829 F.2d 705,709 (9th Cir. 1986). 
Without physical transfer, the sale of the note could be invalid as a fraudulent conveyance, Cal. Civ. Code 
§3440, or as unperfected, Cal. Com. Code §§9313-9314. See Roger Bernhardt, California Mortgages and 
Deeds of Trusts, and Foreclosure Litigation §1.26 (4th ed. 2009). The note here specifically identified the 
party to whom it was payable, Bayrock Mortgage Corporation, and the note therefore cannot be transferred 
unless the note is endorsed. See Cal. Com. Code §§3109, 3201, 3203, 3204. The attachments to the claim 
do not establish that Bayrock Mortgage Corporation endorsed and sold the note to any other party. 
TRANSFER OF AN INTEREST IN THE DEED OF TRUST ALONE IS VOID 
MERS acted only as a "nominee" for Bayrock Mortgage under the Deed of Trust. Since no evidence has 
been offered that the promissory note has been transferred, MERS could only transfer what ever interest it 
had in the Deed of Trust. However, the promissory note and the Deed of Trust are inseparable. "The note 
and the mortgage are inseparable; the former as essential, the later as an incident. An assignment of the 
note carries the mortgage with it, while an assignment of the latter alone is a nullity." Carpenter v. Longan, 
83 U.S. 271, 274 (1872); accord Henley v. Hotaling, 41 Cal. 22, 28 (1871); Seidell v. Tuxedo Land Co., 216 
Cal. 165,170 (1932); Cal. Civ. Code §2936. Therefore, if on party receives the note an another receives 
the deed of trust the holder of the note prevails regardless of the order in which the interests were 
transferred. Adler v. Sargent, 109 Cal. 42, 49-50 (1895). 
Further, several courts have acknowledged that MERS is not the owner of the underlying note and 
therefore could not transfer the note, the beneficial interest in the deed of trust, or foreclose upon the 
property secured by the deed. See In re Foreclosure Cases, 521 F. Supp. 2d 650,653 (S.D. Oh. 2007); In 
re Vargas, 396 B.R. 511, 520 (Bankr. CD. Cal. 2008); Landmark Nafl Bank v. Kesler, 216 P.3d 158 (Kan. 
2009); LaSalle Bank v. Lamy, 824 N.Y.S.2d 769 (N.Y. Sup. CI 2006). Since no evidence of MERS' 
ownership of the underlying note has been offered, and other courts have concluded that MERS does not 
own the underlying notes, this court is convinced that MERS had no interest it could transfer to Citibank. 
Since MERS did not own the underling note, it could not transfer the beneficial interest of the Deed of Trust 
to another. Any attempt to transfer the beneficial interest of a trust deed with out ownership of the 
underlying note is void under California law. Therefore Citibank has not established that it is entitled to 
assert a claim in this case. 
MULTIPLE CLAIMS TO THE BENEFICIAL INTEREST IN THE DEED OF TRUST AND OWNERSHIP OF 
PROMISSORY NOTE SECURED THEREBY 
Debtor also points out that four separate entities have claimed beneficial ownership of the deed of trust 
(Obj. to Claim 3-5, Apr. 6, 2010.) The true owner of the underling promissory note needs to step forward to 
settle the cloud that has been created surrounding the relevant parties rights and interests under the trust 
deed. 
DECISION 
11 U.S.C. §502(a) provides that a claim supported by a Proof of Claim is allowed unless a party in interest 
objects. Once an objection has been filed, the court may determine the amount of the claim after a noticed 
hearing. 11 U.S.C. §502(b). Since the claimant, Citibank, has not established that it is the owner of the 
promissory note secured by the trust deed, Citibank is unable to assert a claim for payment in this case. 
The objection is sustained and Claim Number 5 on the court's official register is disallowed in its entirety, 
with leave for the owner of the promissory note to file a claim in this case by June 18, 2010. 
The court disallowing the proof of claim does not alter or modify the trust deed or the fact that someone has 
an interest in the property which can be subject thereto. The order disallowing the proof of claim shall 
expressly so provide. 
The court shall issue a minute order consistent with this ruling. 
EXHIBIT 
"D" 
NOT FOR PUBUCATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE COMMITTEE ON OPINIONS 
BANK OF NEW YORK, as Trustee for 
Home Mortgage Investment Trust 
2004-4 Mortgage-Backed Notes, 
Series 2004-4 
Plaintiffs), 
vs. 
MICHAEL J. RAFTOGIANIS, his/her 
heirs, devisees and personal 
representatives, and his, her, their or 
any of their successors in right, title 
and interest, ROMAN J. KRYWOPUSK, 
his/her heirs, devisees and personal 
representatives, and his, her, their or 
any of their successors in right, title 
and interest 
Defendants). 
DECIDED: June 29, 2010 
APPEARANCES: 
Brian G. Nicholas, 
attorney for Plaintiff 
Eric Garrabrant 
attorney for Defendant Krywopusk 
WILLIAM C. TODD, ffl, P. J.CH. 
This opinion deals with the plaintiffs right to proceed with an action to foreclose 
a mortgage which secures a debt evidenced by a negotiable note. The original lender 
elected to use the Mortgage Electronic Registration System in recording the mortgage by 
designating that entity, as its nominee, as the mortgagee. The note and mortgage were 
subsequently securitized, without notice to the borrower. This action to foreclose the 
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mortgage was filed years later, in the name of an entity created as a part of the 
securitization process. The defendant/borrower challenged plaintiff's right to proceed 
with the foreclosure. That challenge, framed as a dispute over "standing," has given rise 
to a variety of factual and legal issues typically raised in this type of litigation. 
Ultimately, the questions presented were whether plaintiff could establish its right to 
enforce the obligation evidenced by the note and whether it must establish that it held that 
right at the time the complaint was filed. The answers to those questions require an 
understanding of the provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code, the Mortgage 
Electronic Registration System, the securitization of mortgages and how foreclosure 
litigation is handled. This opinion addresses those disputes. Ultimately, the court 
concluded that it was appropriate to require plaintiff to establish that it had physical 
possession of the note as of the date the complaint was filed. Plaintiff was unable to 
establish that, either by motion or at trial. Accordingly, the complaint has now been 
dismissed on terms permitting plaintiff to institute a new action to foreclose, on the 
condition that any new complaint must be accompanied by an appropriate certification, 
confirming that plaintiff is then in possession of the note. 
In this case, the defendant borrowed $1,380,000 from American Home Mortgage 
Acceptance Inc. (hereafter American Home Acceptance) in September 2004. This action 
to foreclose the mortgage was brought in the name of The Bank of New York, as Trustee 
for American Mortgage Investment Trust 2004-4 Mortgage Backed Notes, Series 2004-4 
in February 2009. In the interim, a variety of transactions took place, involving a number 
of entities. Those transactions will be discussed in some detail below. Preliminarily, this 
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opinion will discuss the UCC, MERS and the securitization process in more general 
terms. 
THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 
Mortgages provide security for the debtor's obligation to pay an underlying 
obligation, ultimately permitting the mortgagee to force the sale of the property to satisfy 
that obligation. As a general proposition, a party seeking to foreclose a mortgage must 
own or control the underlying debt. See Gotlib v. Gotlib, 399 N.J. Super. 295 (App. Div. 
2008); Garroch v. Sherman, 6 N J. Eq. 219 (Ch.1847); and Bellistri v. Ocwen Loan 
Servicing, LLC, 284 S.W.3d. 619 (Mo. 2009). The debt itself is typically evidenced by 
some other document. The manner in which one obtains control over the debt will depend 
upon the nature of the underlying obligation. 
Typically, the debt secured by a mortgage will be evidenced by a bond or a note. 
Notes, in turn, may be negotiable or nonnegotiable. The handling of negotiable 
instruments presents a variety of distinct issues, precisely because they are "negotiable." 
Issues may be presented, in a variety of circumstances, as to just how interests in a 
negotiable instrument can be transferred or "negotiated," and as to the rights and 
responsibilities of those involved, including the original obligor, the original obligee and 
third parties. Disputes over the handling of negotiable instruments can arise in a variety 
of contexts. 
Negotiable instruments, which include negotiable notes, are governed by Article 
3 of the Uniform Commercial Code (hereafter, the UCC), codified in this state as 
N.J.S.A. 12A:3-101, et seq. Checks, drafts and certificates of deposit are other forms of 
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negotiable instruments which are subject to the UCC. There are specific provisions of the 
UCC dealing with just who may enforce an instrument. One's ability to enforce an 
instrument will depend on one's status, which in turn depends on what interests have 
been acquired and just how those were acquired. In that context, it is often necessary to 
determine whether the person seeking to enforce the note is a "holder" or has some other 
status. How one becomes a holder will depend, at least in part, on the nature of the 
instrument or note. Different rules apply to notes which are payable "to bearer" or "to 
order." It is generally necessary to determine whether a negotiable note has effectively 
been "transferred" and/or "negotiated." 
As an aside, different issues may be presented when the debt is evidenced by a 
bond or a nonnegotiable note. Nonnegotiable notes are transferred by "assignment" and 
not by "negotiation," without reference to the provisions of the UCC dealing with 
negotiable instruments. See 29 New Jersey Practice, Law of Mortgages 11.2 at 749 
(Myron C. Weinstein) (2d ed. 2001) and 1 Nelson & Whitman, Real Estate Finance Law 
5.28 (3d ed. 1993). Additional issues may also be presented where it is necessary to 
determine whether one who is a holder is also a "holder in due course," which may affect 
the defenses that can be asserted against the holder in an action to enforce the note. 
Neither of those circumstances are presented here. In that context, this opinion focuses on 
the plaintiffs right to enforce a negotiable note, without reference to its potential status 
as a holder in due course. 
A number of provisions of the UCC deal with the right to enforce negotiable 
instruments. The issues presented here are dealt with most directly in N.J.S.A. 12A:3-
301. That section of the statute reads as follows: 
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12A:3-301. Person entitled to enforce instrument 
"Person entitled to enforce" an instrument means the holder 
of the instrument, a nonholder in possession of the 
instrument who has the rights of the holder, or a person not 
in possession of the instrument who is entitled to enforce 
the instrument pursuant to 12A:3-309 or subsection d. of 
12A:3-418. A person may be a person entitled to enforce 
the instrument even though the person is not the owner of 
the instrument or is in wrongful possession of the 
instrument. 
The issue presented here is whether plaintiff was, at the appropriate time, either 
"the holder of the instrument," or "a nonholder in possession of the instrument who has 
the rights of the holder." (N.J.S.A. 12A:3-309 deals with the enforcement of instruments 
which have been lost, destroyed or stolen. Subsection d. ofNJ.S.A. 12A:3-418 deals 
with circumstances where an instrument has been paid or accepted by mistake and the 
payor or acceptor recovers payment or revokes acceptance. Neither of those sections of 
the statute apply here.) The resolution of that issue depends on the nature of the note and 
just what was done with the note itself. 
How does one become a holder of a negotiable note? In addressing that question 
it is necessary to distinguish between "transfer" and "negotiation." It is also necessary to 
distinguish between the handling of notes payable "to order" and notes payable "to 
bearer." In this particular case, it is also necessary to recognize that a note initially made 
payable "to order" can become a bearer instrument, if it is endorsed in blank. See 
N.IS.A. 12A:3- 109(c), providing that an instrument payable to an identified person may 
become payable to bearer if it is endorsed in blank. See also N.J.S.A. 12A:3~205(b). 
describing what qualifies as a blank endorsement, and The Law of Modern Payment 
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Systems and Notes 2.02 at 77-78, Miller and Hanrell (2002), noting that an instrument 
bearing the indorsement "Pay to the order of " is a bearer instrument. Such a 
bearer note can be both transferred and negotiated by delivery alone. See Corporacion 
Venezolana de Fomento v. Vintero Sales. 452 F. Supp. 1108, 1117 (Dist Ct 1978). 
Under the UCC, the transfer of an instrument requires that it be delivered for the 
purpose of giving the person receiving the instrument the right to enforce it. A negotiable 
note can be transferred without being negotiated. That transfer would be effected by the 
physical delivery of the note. See NJ.S.A. 12A:3»203(a). In that cfrcumstance, the 
transferee would not be a holder, as that term is used in the UCC. Such a transferee, 
however, would still have the right to enforce the note. The UCC deals with that 
circumstance in the following language: 
Transfer of an instrument, whether or not the transfer is a 
negotiation, vests in the transferee any right of the 
transferor to enforce the instrument, including any right as 
a holder in due course, but the transferee cannot acquire 
rights of a holder in due course by a transfer, directly or 
indirectly, from a holder in due course if the transferee 
engaged in fraud or illegality affecting the instrument. 
NJ.S.A. 12A:3-203(b). 
The negotiation of the instrument, on the other hand, requires both a transfer of 
possession and an endorsement by the holder. An instrument which is payable to bearer 
may be negotiated by transfer alone. Put otherwise, an instrument payable "to order" can 
be negotiated by delivery with an endorsement, while an instrument payable "to bearer" 
can be negotiated by delivery alone. NJ.S.A. 12A:3-201. To enforce the note at issue 
here as a holder pursuant to NJ.S.A. 12A:3-301, plaintiff would have to establish that it 
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received the note, through negotiation, at the appropriate time. That would require that 
the note be endorsed prior to or at the time of delivery, either in favor of plaintiff or in 
blank. 
NJ.S.A. 12A:3-301 also provides that an instrument may be enforced by "a non 
holder in possession of the instrument who has the rights of a holder." How does one 
obtain that status? That may occur, by example, where a creditor of a holder acquires an 
instrument through execution. See The Law of Modem Payment Systems and Notes 3.01 
Miller and Harrell (2002). More frequently, that status will be created by the "transfer" 
of the instrument, without negotiation. As already noted, transfer occurs when the 
instrument is delivered for the purpose of giving the person receiving the instrument the 
right to enforce it. See NJ.S.A. 12A:3-203(a). The statute also provides that the transfer 
of the instrument, without negotiation, vests in the transferee the transferor's right to 
enforce the instrument. See NJ.S.A. 12A:3-203(b). That circumstance can be illustrated 
by reference to the dispute presented here. The note at issue, as originally drafted, was 
payable "to the order of the original lender. The negotiation of the note, in that form, 
would require endorsement, either to a designated recipient of the note or in blank. The 
note, however, could be transferred without an endorsement. Assuming the transfer was 
for the purpose of giving the recipient the ability to enforce the note, the recipient would 
become a "nonholder in possession with the rights of a holder." That would require, 
however, the physical delivery of the note. A number of cases recognize that there can be 
constructive delivery or possession, through the delivery of the instrument to an agent of 
the owner. See Midfirst Bank, SSB v. C.W. Havnes & Company, 893 F. Supp. 1304, 
1314-1315 (S.C. 1994); Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. v. Linn, 671 F. Supp. 547, 553 
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(N.D, 111. 1987); and Corporation Venezolana de Fomento v. Vintero Sales Corp, 452 F. 
Supp, 1108,1117(SJD.N.Y. 1978). 
Under either of the provisions ofNJ.S.A.12A:3-301 which are at issue here, the 
person seeking to enforce the note must have possession. That is required to be a holder, 
and to be a nonholder in possession with the rights of a holder. The application of the 
provisions of the UCC to the dispute presented here will be discussed below. 
MERS 
The Mortgage Electronic Registration System (hereafter, MERS), is a unique 
entity. Its involvement in the foreclosure process has been the subject of a substantial 
amount of litigation throughout the country, resulting in the issuance of a number of 
reported opinions. Recently, MERS was the focus of a decision of the Supreme Court: of 
Kansas, reported as Landmark National Bank v. Kesler, 289 Kan. 528,216 P.3d. 158 
(Kan, 2009) which is now cited frequently in this court. That opinion reviews the manner 
in which MERS functions, the potential problems it can create, and some of the 
competing policy issues presented. The opinion also cites a variety of published opinions 
from around the country, addressing those same issues. 
In essence, MERS is a private corporation which administers a national electronic 
registry which tracks the transfer of ownership interests and servicing rights in mortgage 
loans. Lenders participate as members of the MERS system. When mortgage loans are 
initially placed, the lenders will retain the underlying notes but can arrange for MERS to 
be designated as the mortgagees on the mortgages which become a part of the public 
record. In that context, the lenders are able to transfer their interests to others, without 
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having to record those subsequent transactions in the public record. See Mortgage Elec, 
Reg. Svs. Inc. v. Nebraska Depart. Of Banking, 270 Neb, 529, 530,704 N.W.2d 784 
(2005), cited in Landmark. The process is apparently cost efficient, from the perspective 
of the lenders. Among other things, the use of MERS permits lenders to avoid the 
payment of filing fees that might otherwise be required with the filing of multiple 
assignments. By the same token, it can make it difficult for mortgagors and others to 
identify the individual or entity which actually controls the debt at any specific time. See 
Landmark, 216 P.3& at 168. On occasion, foreclosure actions are also brought in the 
name of MERS. When MERS is involved, defendant/borrowers often argue there has 
been a "separation" of the note and mortgage impacting on the plaintiffs ability to 
proceed with the foreclosure. That argument has been raised here and will also be 
addressed below. 
SECURITIZATION 
This case also involves the securitization of mortgage loans, a practice which is 
facilitated by the MERS system. Trial courts in this state regularly deal with the 
foreclosure of mortgages which have previously been securitized. Generally, one or more 
lenders will sell substantial numbers of mortgage loans they have issued to a pool or trust. 
Interests in that pool or trust are then sold to individual investors, who receive certificates 
entitling them to share in the funds received as the underlying loans are repaid. That can 
occur without any notice to the debtors/mortgagors who remain obligated on the original 
notes. Other entities, generally called "servicers," are retained to administer the 
underlying loans. Those servicers or additional "subservicers" will be responsible for 
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collecting and distributing the funds which are due from the debtors/mortgagors. Many 
are given the authority to institute and prosecute foreclosure proceedings. 
The securitization of mortgages has a long and somewhat involved history in this 
country, dating back to the nineteenth century. More recently, the federal government 
became involved in various forms of securitization through the Federal National 
Mortgage Asssociation (FNMA, or "Fannie Mae) and the Government National 
Mortgage Association (GNMA or "Ginnie Mae). Private institutions became more 
involved in securitization of mortgages beginning in the 1970s. Over time the stracturing 
and issuance of private mortgage based securities became much more complex and 
widespread, contributing to the recent crisis in the financial markets. For a detailed 
analysis of the history of securitization, the role of pricing models, risk- and term-
partitioned securities, and rating agencies, see Christopher L. Peterson, Predatory 
Structured Finance, 28 Cardozo L. Rev. 2185 (April 2007). 
The securitization of mortgages also presents competing policy concerns. The 
securitization of mortgage debt facilitates the investment of funds from various sources 
into a pool or trust. That in turn presumably provides additional sources of funds to 
support mortgage lending. By the same token, the relationship between the holder of the 
debt and the debtor/mortgagor becomes more attenuated and potentially confusing. That 
can be particularly problematic when a matter proceeds to foreclosure, when substantial 
issues may be presented as to the propriety of some type of forbearance, loan 
modification or the forced sale of mortgaged property. Additional problems can be 
presented in those circumstances where a borrower may have potential claims against 
those involved in making the original loan. At least one commentator has suggested that 
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securitization has placed substantial limitations on attempts to remedy or regulate 
predatory lending practices. See Predatory Structured Finance, cited above. 
As noted, this case involves both MERS and the securitization of the underlying 
debt. Each of those circumstances can operate independently. Lenders who participate 
in the MERS system may not be involved in the securitization of their mortgage loans. 
Similarly, lenders may elect to securitize their mortgage loans without participating in the 
MERS system. When each circumstance is involved, however, the potential for 
confusion increases. 
It is in that context that it is necessary to address the disputes raised by defendant 
here as to plaintiff's right to proceed with the foreclosure. Preliminarily, it is appropriate 
to review the underlying transactions. 
DEFENDANT'S LOAN 
The property at issue in this matter was purchased by defendants in September 
2004. That purchase was funded, at least in part, by a loan from American Home 
Acceptance in the amount of $1,380,000. Title was apparently taken in the name of 
defendant Krywopusk and defendant Raftogianis. The loan closed on or about September 
30,2004, which is presumably the date on which title was transferred to defendants. 
Defendant Raftogianis executed a note in the amount just noted, payable to American 
Home Acceptance. The note provided for interest, at a rate which was subject to 
adjustment over time. Payments of interest and principal were due on a monthly basis, for 
a period of approximately thirty years, the first monthly payment being due November 1, 
2004. On September 30, 2004, defendant Krywopusk and defendant Raftogianis each 
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executed a mortgage encumbering Ihe property, to secure the note, A definitional section 
of the mortgage describes the "Lender" as American Home Acceptance. The same 
section of the mortgage refers to MERS as "a separate corporation that is acting solely as 
a nominee for Lender and Lender's successors and assigns." The mortgagee, as 
described in the mortgage itself, is MERS, "as nominee for the Lender." The mortgage 
was recorded with the Atlantic County Clerk on October 20,2004. Defendants defaulted 
on the payments required under the note in October 2008. 
The note executed by defendant Raftogianis is clearly a negotiable instrument as 
that term is defined by the UCC, In the terms of the statute, the note is payable to bearer 
or to order, and it is payable on demand or at a definite time. While the note contains 
detailed provisions as to just how payment is to be made, it does not state any other 
undertaking or instruction by the person promising or ordering payment to do any act in 
addition to the payment of money. See NJ.S.A. 12A:3-104. The note recites that 
defendant Raftogianis "promises to pay U.S. $1,380,000.00 ... plus interest, to the order 
of the Lender," then referring to "the Lender" as American Home Acceptance, beginning 
with payments due in November 2004. See NJ.S.A. 12A:3-104(a)(l), (2) and (3). 
This note, as originally drafted, was payable "to order." At some point, however, 
the note was indorsed in blank. The original note was produced at oral argument on the 
motion for summary judgment. It contained the following indorsement: 
WITHOUT RECOURSE 
BY AMERICAN HOME MORTAGE ACCEPTANCE, INC. 
RENEEBURY 
ASST. SECRETARY 
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Ms. Bury's original signature was just above her printed name in that 
indorsement. Defendant had signed the note on September 30, 2004, payable to the order 
of American Home Acceptance. In that form the note could be transferred by delivery, 
but could only be negotiated by indorsement. The indorsement in blank, however, would 
effectively make the note payable "to bearer," permitting it to be transferred and 
negotiated by delivery alone, without any additional indorsement. 
While it was clear the note had been indorsed prior to the time it was presented to 
the court, presumably as a part of the securitization process, it was not clear just when 
that occurred, or when the note had been physically transferred from American Home 
Acceptance to some other individual or entity. 
THE SECURITIZATION OF THE LOAN 
In or about December 2004, a group of mortgage loans held by American Home 
Acceptance were securitized. While the court is now satisfied that defendants' loan was 
among that group of loans securitized, that was not at all clear from the documents 
initially submitted by plaintiff, as will be discussed below. The securitization of the loan 
was not referenced in the complaint, or even in plaintiffs initial motion for summary 
judgment. (Judges and lawyers who regularly handle foreclosure litigation would 
probably recognize that the matter involved a loan which had been securitized just from 
the description of plaintiff in the complaint, as "The Bank of New York, as Trustee for 
American Mortgage Investment Trust 2004-4 Mortgage Backed Notes, Series 2004-4. 
There is no apparent reason, however, why a layperson not familiar with the 
securitization process would recognize that.) The materials which were ultimately 
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presented, however, did document the process by which the mortgage loans were 
securitized. 
The documents provided in this case are typical of those presented in other 
matters involving the securitization of mortgage loans. Those documents are lengthy, 
complex and difficult to xmderstand. Included in the materials ultimately provided was a 
Mortgage Loan Purchase Agreement, an Amended and Restated Trust Agreement, an 
Indenture, and a Servicing Agreement. (The Indenture in this case is in excess of 100 
pages, without attachments. An attachment which simply defines the terms used in the 
Indenture itself contains 55 pages.) Much of that complexity in those documents relates 
to the interests held by those who invest in the securitized loans, and how the Trust is 
structured and administered. The transfers or assignments of the underlying mortgage 
loans involve other comple?dties. 
Defendants' original lender was American Home Acceptance. Under the terms of 
the Mortgage Loan Purchase Agreement, American Home Acceptance, as seller, sold its 
interests in a group of mortgage loans to American Home Mortgage Securities LLC 
(hereafter American Home Securities), as purchaser. The Mortgage Loan Purchase 
Agreement contemplates an additional transfer of those mortgage loans by American 
Home Securities to the Trust. It also refers to The Bank of New York as Indenture 
Trustee for the Trust. 
The Amended and Restated Trust Agreement provides for the creation of the 
Trust itself, apparently amending a prior Trust Agreement. That Amended and Restated 
Trust Agreement involves three primary parties—American Home Securities (the 
Depositor), Wilmington Trust Company (the Owner Trustee), and The Bank of New 
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York (the Indenture Trustee). One portion of the Trust Agreement recites that the 
Depositor does thereby transfer its right, title and interest in the mortgage loans to the 
Trust. Another section of the Trust Agreement reflects the Owner Trustee's 
acknowledgement of receipt of the mortgage loans. See Sections 3.01 and 2.05 of the 
Trust Agreement. Another section of the Trust Agreement notes that the mortgage loans 
will be assigned to the Indenture Trustee, pursuant to the Indenture. See Section 2.08 of 
the Trust Agreement. 
The Indenture itself does provide for that additional transfer to The Bank of New 
York as Indenture Trustee. There are two primary parties to the Indenture—the Trust 
itself, described as the Issuer, and The Bank of New York, as Indenture Trustee. The 
Indenture recites that the Issuer does grant to the Indenture Trustee all its right, title and 
interest in the mortgage loans, as well as its rights under the Mortgage Loan Purchase 
Agreement. The same portion of the Indenture contains the Indenture Trustee's 
acceptance of the trust, "as trustee on behalf of the Holders of the Notes and the Insurer," 
referring to those who have invested in the securitized mortgages. See the Granting 
Clause in the Indenture. In a subsequent portion of the Indenture, The Bank of New York, 
as Indenture Trustee, covenants that it will establish an "Eligible Account" in which it 
will deposit each remittance it receives from the servicer with respect to the mortgage 
loans. See Section 3.01 of the Indenture. 
The Servicing Agreement confirms the arrangements for the servicing of the 
mortgage loans. There are three primary parties to the Servicing Agreement—American 
Home Mortgage Servicing Inc., described as the RMBS Master Servicer, the Trust as 
Issuer, and The Bank of New York as Indenture Trustee. The Servicing Agreement 
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specifically provides the servicer with the authority to proceed with foreclosures. 
Notably, the same section of the Servicing Agreement authorizes the servicer to register 
mortgage loans with MERS, and to cause a mortgage loan to be removed from 
registration with MERS. See Section 3.01 of the Servicing Agreement. 
The various documents noted were dated "as of December 21, 2004, suggesting 
they may actually have been executed on some other date. Testimony was presented at 
trial confirming that the documents were all executed on December 21,2004, the date of 
the closing on the securitization of the loans. 
It is apparent that the parties to the securitization did understand that some of the 
loans being securitized were evidenced by negotiable notes. Several provisions deal with 
the handling of the notes in very specific terms. Deutsche Bank National Trust Company 
is identified as Custodian for the Indenture Trustee. The Mortgage Loan Purchase 
Agreement provides that American Home Acceptance, as seller, acting on behalf of 
American Home Securities, as purchaser, is to deliver and deposit the original mortgage 
notes "endorsed without recourse to the order of the Indenture Trustee or in blank" to 
Deutsche Bank, as Custodian, "on or before the closing date." The closing date is 
identified elsewhere in the documents as December 24,2004. See Section 2.01 (b) of the 
Mortgage Loan Purchase Agreement. In addition, the Indenture provides that the 
Indenture Trustee is to cause the Custodian, as agent for the Indenture Trustee, to 
acknowledge receipt of documents referred to in the Mortgage Loan Purchase 
Agreement, which would include the mortgage notes. In short, the documents indicate 
that the parties to the securitization process did intend that the mortgage notes being 
securitized would be endorsed in favor of the Indenture Trustee or in blank, and would be 
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held by Deutsche Bank as custodian, acting for the Indenture Trustee. The endorsement 
appearing on the copy of the note provided by plaintiff in conjunction with the motion for 
summary judgment is consistent with those documents. The actual delivery of the notes 
to Deutsche Bank, as custodian, would presumably constitute constructive delivery to the 
Indenture Trustee. 
Separate questions are presented, however, as to whether the note was in fact 
physically transferred to plaintiff, when that would have occurred and whether the note 
had been endorsed prior to that time. Those are issues that would have to be addressed 
before one could determine whether the plaintiff was a person entitled to enforce the note 
pursuant to the UCC at any particular time. 
PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
THE MISSING LOAN SCHEDULE 
The original complaint in this matter was filed in the name of The Bank of New 
York, as Trustee for American Mortgage Investment Trust 2004-4 Mortgage-Backed 
Notes, Series 2004-4 on February 9,2009. It recited that plaintiff had become the owner 
of the note and mortgage "before the within complaint was drafted." It does not refer to 
the securitization of the loan, any of the entities involved in the securitization process, or 
any transfer or assignment from either American Home Acceptance or MERS. The 
complaint provided no information as to possession of the note. 
Defendant Krywopusk filed an answer, counterclaim and crossclaim on May 6, 
2009. Plaintiff, apparently unaware of the filing of defendant's answer, filed an amended 
complaint specifically reciting the execution and recording of an assignment from MERS. 
That amended complaint was not filed until May 7, 2009. 
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The assignment from MERS was executed and recorded a short time after the 
complaint was filed. That document is dated February 18,2009. It is captioned 
"Assignment of Mortgage." It recites that MERS, as nominee for American Home 
Acceptance, transfers and assigns the mortgage at issue to Bank of New York, as Trustee. 
The assignment refers to the mortgage as securing the note at issue. It recites the transfer 
of the mortgage "together with all rights therein and thereto, all liens created or secured 
thereby, all obligations therein described, the money due and to become due with interest, 
and all rights accrued or to accrue under such mortgage," The assignment was executed 
by one Linda Green, as Vice President of MERS, as nominee for American Home 
Acceptance. Ms. Green's signature was notarized, The assignment was recorded with the 
Atlantic County Clerk on February 24,2009. It does appear the assignment was intended 
to indicate that the debt in question had been transferred to the Bank of New York as 
Indenture Trustee in February 2009. It is now apparent that is not what occurred. 
In any event, the matter proceeded in the vicinage based upon the filing of 
defendant's contesting answer. While discovery was permitted, the parties apparently 
elected to forego any formal discovery. 
Plaintiff filed its motion for summary judgment in January 2010. The motion was 
based upon a certification from plaintiffs counsel providing copies of the note, the 
mortgage and the February 2009 assignment. While the copy of the note provided with 
the motion did contain the blank indorsement noted above, there was no information 
provided as to when the note was indorsed, when the note was physically transferred, or 
where the note was being held. Defendant filed written opposition, challenging the 
validity of the MERS assignment. Plaintiff responded with a certification executed by a 
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supervisor for American Home Mortgage Servicing, Inc., the servicer for the loans. 
While that additional certification recited that the note and mortgage had previously been 
sold to plaintiff, it did that in conclusory terms. No additional documentation was 
provided. Neither plaintiffs motion nor plaintiff's reply to defendant's opposition 
addressed the securitization of the debt, or the transfer or negotiation of the underlying 
note. The court then required the production of the documents executed as a part of the 
securitization process. The motion was adjourned 
Plaintiff then provided three separate servicing agreements which had apparently 
been entered into as a part of the securitization process. The servicing agreements were 
not signed. The underlying documentation was not provided. The court again directed 
that the underlying documentation be provided. The motion was adjourned again. 
The additional documents were provided, with an affidavit executed by another 
representative of the servicer. Those documents included the Amended and Restated 
Trust Agreement, the Mortgage Loan Purchase Agreement, the Indenture and the 
Servicing Agreement. While the copies provided were signed, schedules referenced in the 
documents as listing the mortgage loans being securitized were not attached. For that 
reason, there was no way to confirm that defendant's loan was among those which had 
been securitized. The court again directed plaintiff to supplement its earlier submissions 
with copies of the applicable schedules. The motion was adjourned again. 
Plaintiffs counsel then advised that plaintiff was unable to obtain a copy of the 
loan schedule at issue, noting that the law firm which had served as closing counsel when 
the loans were securitized had dissolved, and that plaintiff did not have any other sources 
which might be able to provide the schedule. In that same correspondence, plaintiff's 
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counsel indicated that his office had requested that the original note be forwarded to it, 
suggesting the original note could be presented at the time of argument on the motion. 
Notably, that was the first time that plaintiff's representatives suggested plaintiff would 
attempt to establish its right to proceed based on its possession of the note. See Mr. 
Ford's letter of April 15, 2010. The court declined to adjourn the matter again. Argument 
was conducted April 23,2010. 
The day before the argument, plaintiffs counsel submitted yet another 
certification, which appeared to contradict his prior submission. That certification was 
executed by Glenn E. Mitchell, who described himself as Vice President of The Bank: of 
New York, as Indenture Trustee. (Notably, that was the first certification executed by an 
officer or employee of the plaintiff, as opposed to the servicer.) That certification 
reviewed the underlying circumstanqes in some detail. Attached to the certification was a 
redacted loan schedule, referred to in the certification as a "loan schedule for the Trust," 
The one entry appearing on the redacted schedule appears to list the loan at issue here. It 
was unclear whether the schedule in question was in fact attached to one or more of the 
underlying documents. There was no explanation for the apparent change in plaintiffs 
circumstances, which permitted it to produce the schedule which was previously 
unavailable. 
Plaintiff's counsel did present the original note at the time of argument and 
argued that the presentation of the original note alone, at that time, was sufficient to 
establish plaintiffs right to proceed, That argument was rejected. The motion for 
summary judgment was denied. A hearing was scheduled to address just how and when 
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the note was transferred, and whether the plaintiff did have the right to enforce the note at 
the time the complaint was filed. That hearing was conducted in June 2010. 
LEGAL ANALYSIS 
This is a dispute over plaintiffs right to proceed with the foreclosure. There are a 
number of ways to frame the issue. 
In the most general sense, defendant questioned whether plaintiff could establish 
that it had, in fact, acquired the right to enforce the note and mortgage. Defendant 
specifically challenged plaintiffs reliance on the February 2009 assignment from MERS, 
arguing that MERS simply did not have the authority to assign the note, given the prior 
"separation" of the note and mortgage. In responding to those challenges, plaintiff has 
offered a variety of alternative bases for its right to proceed with the foreclosure. At 
various times, plaintiff has argued that it has established its right to proceed based on: (1) 
the February 2009 assignment from MERS alone; (2) the documents executed in or about 
December 2004 evidencing an intention to transfer the debt to the Trust; and (3) its actual 
possession of the note, endorsed in blank, as presented at argument on the motion for 
summary judgment. Focusing on the UCC, plaintiff has argued that it is either a holder, 
or a nonholder in possession with the right to enforce the note, pursuant to N.J.S.A. 12A: 
3-301. At trial, plaintiff attempted to establish that it did have possession of the note as of 
the date the original complaint was filed. 
Obviously, there is a temporal component to the dispute. Plaintiff filed its 
complaint for foreclosure in February 2009, alleging that it had become the owner of the 
note and mortgage "before the complaint was filed," It then filed an amended complaint 
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in May 2009, referring to the MERS assignment to plaintiff executed in February 2009, 
suggesting it somehow obtained the right to proceed based on that assignment. By the 
time motions for summary judgment were argued in April 2010, plaintiff was asserting a 
right to proceed based on its actual possession of the note at the time the motions were 
argued, without presenting any meaningful proofs as to the transfer or negotiation of the 
note, or just when any transfer or negotiation occurred. The ultimate question is clear—is 
this action now being prosecuted by one who does have the authority to enforce the 
underlying obligation? The temporal question, however, is just as important- would it 
be appropriate to permit the plaintiff to proceed with this action for foreclosure if it did 
not have the right to enforce the note as of the date the complaint was filed? 
The remainder of this opinion will address those legal and equitable issues, 
focusing on the three claims asserted by plaintiff, noted above. 
THE MERS ASSIGNMENT-THE SEPARATION 
OF THE NOTE AND MORTGAGE 
The facts presented here are typical. The lender agrees to lend monies to the 
property owner, to be secured by a mortgage encumbering the property owner's real 
estate. The property owner executes a note reflecting the obligation to repay the debt, 
payable to the lender. The property owner also executes a mortgage securing the 
obligation to repay the debt. The mortgage provides that the property is mortgaged and 
conveyed to MERS as nominee for lender and the lender's successors and assigns. In 
short, the note is payable to the lender, and the mortgage is in favor of MERS as nominee 
for the lender. Defendant suggests that creates a "separation" of the note and mortgage, 
restricting the ability to foreclose. 
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Plaintiff's position is relatively simple. In essence, plaintiff indicates that the debt 
in question—consisting of both the note and the mortgage—has been transferred to it, 
that defendants have defaulted on their obligations under the note and mortgage, and that 
plaintiff should be permitted to proceed through judgment and sale, enforcing its right to 
look to the property to satisfy the debt. Defendant questions the accuracy and validity of 
the documents presented by plaintiff, focusing on the alleged "separation" of the note and 
mortgage as impacting on plaintiffs right to proceed. In large part, defendant relies on 
case law indicating that a party seeking foreclosure must own or control the underlying 
debt, and may not proceed based on his control of the mortgage alone. See, for example, 
Gotlib v. Gotlib, 399 N.J. Super. 295 (App. Div. 2008); Garroch v. Sherman, 6 NJ. Eq. 
219 (Ch. 1847); and Bellistri v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC. 284 S.W.3& 619 (Mo. 
2009). 
There are a number of components to defendant's argument based on the alleged 
separation of the note and mortgage. Defendant argues that the note and mortgage were 
originally held by separate entities- the note being held by American Home Acceptance 
and the mortgage being held by MERS. It follows, defendant argues, that MERS held 
only the mortgage and not the note, that MERS was not in a position to assign or transfer 
the note to plaintiff, and that plaintiff therefore cannot have acquired the note. Without 
the note, defendant argues, plaintiff does not have standing to proceed with the 
foreclosure. The concepts underlying those arguments are not particularly controversial. 
Obviously, the law recognizes the distinction between the debt itself and the pledging of 
collateral to secure the debt. Logically, the right to enforce mortgage would have to be 
based on ownership of the underlying debt. 
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In most circumstances, a note and related mortgage will be held by the same 
individual or entity. The obligors and obligees referenced on the note and mortgage will 
generally be the same. Transfers or assignments would involve both instruments. It is 
difficult to imagine circumstances where one would want to hold a mortgage, without 
having the right to act on the underlying debt. By the same token, there is no technical 
reason why the interests could not be separated in one way or another. Indeed, this case 
does present one somewhat unusual circumstance related to the mortgaging of the 
property—the note in this case was signed by defendant Raftogianis alone, while the 
mortgage was signed by both defendant Raftogianis and defendant Krywopusk. 
Defendant argues that the note and mortgage were "separated" when those 
documents were first created, distinguishing between the designation of American Home 
Acceptance as the payee on the note, and MERS, as nominee for American Home 
Acceptance, as the mortgagee. The argument is creative, but not convincing. It ignores 
the most basic circumstance presented. It should be obvious to anyone with any basic 
understanding of the circumstances that there was no real intent to "separate" the note 
and mortgage. The debt in question was clearly payable to American Home Acceptance. 
The designation of MERS as nominee on the mortgage was simply intended to permit the 
recording of the mortgage in a way that would facilitate subsequent transfers through 
MERS without the recording of additional documents. One could debate the propriety 
and efficacy of using MERS in terms of policy. It is clear, however, that there was no 
real intent to separate ownership of the note and mortgage at the time those documents 
were created. 
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The issue is framed, at least in part, by the description of MERS as "nominee." 
The use of that term, as it is used by MERS, was analyzed in some detail in the decision 
of the Supreme Court of Kansas in Landmark, a case relied upon by defendant and cited 
above. Landmark involved a property which was encumbered by two mortgages. The 
loan provided by Landmark National Bank was secured by a first mortgage payable to it. 
There was a second mortgage on the property securing a loan that had been provided by 
Millennia Mortgage Corp. Millennia was a participant in MERS. The second mortgage 
securing the debt due Millennia was in the name of MERS "solely as nominee" for 
Millennia. The Millennia mortgage was subsequently transfeired or assigned to 
Sovereign Bank. That transfer was not reflected in the public record. Landmark filed an 
action to foreclose its first mortgage naming Millennia, but neither MERS nor Sovereign 
as defendants. No one responded on behalf of Millennia and the matter proceeded 
through judgment and sale. Sovereign subsequently filed a motion to set aside the 
judgment, arguing that MERS was a "contingently necessary party" under Kansas law. 
The trial court concluded that MERS was not a real party in interest and denied the 
motion to set aside the judgment. Both the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court of 
Kansas affirmed, essentially concluding that MERS did not have any real interest in the 
underlying debt. Notably, the opinion of the Supreme Court of Kansas recognizes the 
potential for the separation of interests in a note and related mortgage. In that context, the 
opinion addressed the use of the term "nominee" in some detail, as follows: 
The legal status of a nominee, then, depends on the context 
of the relationship of the nominee to its principal. Various 
courts have interpreted the relationship of MERS and the 
lender as an agency relationship. (Citation omitted) 
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The relationship that MERS has to Sovereign is more akin 
to that of a straw man than to a party possessing all the 
rights given a buyer. A mortgage and a lender have 
intertwined rights that defy a clear separation of interests, 
especially when such a purported separation relies on 
ambiguous contractual language. The law generally 
understands that a mortgagee is not distinct from a lender: a 
mortgagee is "[o]ne to whom property is mortgaged: the 
mortgage creditor, or lender.5' Black's Law Dictionary 
1034 (8th ed. 2004). By statute, assignment of the mortgage 
carries with it the assignment of the debt. K.S.A. 38-2323. 
Although MERS asserts that, under some situations the 
mortgage document purports to give it the same rights as 
the lender, the document consistently refers only to rights 
of the lender, including rights to receive notice of litigation 
to collect payments, and to enforce the debt obligation. 
The document consistently limits MERS to acting "solely" 
as the nominee of lender. 
289 Kan. 538-540. 
While the Landmark court recognized that Issues might be raised as to an alleged 
separation of a note and mortgage, it was not required to address those issues directly. Its 
analysis of the role MERS plays as nominee, however, supports the conclusion reached 
by this court with respect to that issue. MERS, as nominee, does not have any real 
interest in the underlying debt, or the mortgage which secured that debt. It acts simply as 
an agent or "straw man" for the lender. It is clear to this court that the provisions of the 
mortgage describing the mortgagee as MERS "as nominee" were not intended to deprive 
American Home Acceptance of its right to security under the mortgage or to separate the 
note and mortgage. 
It is a fundamental maxim of equity that "[ejquity looks to substance rather than 
form." See Applestein v. United Board & Carton Corp.. 60 N J. Super. 333, 348 (Ch. 
Div. 1960) aff d o.b., 33 NX 72 (1960). The courts have applied that principle in dealing 
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with mortgages in a variety of contexts. So it is that an assignment of a bond or note 
evidencing a secured obligation will operate as an assignment of the mortgage "in 
equity." See 29 New Jersey Practice, Law of Mortgages 11.2, at 748 (Myron C. 
Weinstein) (2d ed. 2001) (citing Stevenson v. Black 1 N.J. Eq. 338,343 (Ch. 1831) and 
other cases). Conversely, commentators have noted the propriety of treating the 
assignment of a mortgage, without a specific reference to the underlying obligation, as 
effectively transferring both interests. 
But it does not follow that an assignment in terms of the 
"mortgage" without express reference to the secured 
obligation is insufficient to transfer the obligation and is 
therefore a nullity, as some courts have held. As Mr. Tiffany 
long ago pointed out, 
The question is properly one of the construction of 
the language used, and in arriving at the proper 
construction, evidence of the sense in which that 
language is ordinarily used is of primary 
importance. The expression "assignment of 
mortgage" is almost universally used, not only by 
the general public, but also by the Legislature, the 
courts, and the legal profession, to describe the 
transfer of the totality of the mortgagee's rights, that 
is, his right to the debt as well as to the lien securing 
it, and to hold, as these cases apparently do, that 
when one in terms assigns a mortgage, he intends, 
not an effective transfer of his lien alone, which is 
an absolute nullity, not only ignores this ordinary 
use of the term "mortgage", but is also in direct 
contravention of the well recognized rule that an 
instrument shall if possible be construed so as to 
give it a legal operation. 
See 29 New Jersey Practice, Law of Mortgages 11.2 at 
754(Myron C, Weinstein)(2d ed.2001) (citing 5 Tiffany on 
Real Property 428-29). 
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It is apparent there was no real intention to separate the note and mortgage at the 
time those documents were created. American Home Acceptance remained the owner of 
both the note and mortgage through the date the loan was securitized. It did have the right 
to transfer its interests when the loan was securitized. 
It was entirely appropriate to argue that the February 2009 assignment from 
MERS, as nominee for American Home Acceptance, to the Bank of New York, as 
Trustee, was ineffective. From the court's perspective, that assignment was, at best, a 
distraction. The actual transfers of interests in the note and mortgage occurred in different 
ways. There was no reason, however, that plaintiff could not acquire the right to enforce 
the note and mortgage through those other transactions. In that context, defendant's 
attack on plaintiffs right to proceed based on the alleged separation of the note and 
mortgage is rejected. 
ENFORCEMENT WITHOUT POSSESSION—THE 
REAL PARTY IN INTEREST ISSUE 
Plaintiff also argues that it should be permitted to proceed based on the 
documents presented by the time the motion was argued, without establishing that it had 
possession of the note at the time the complaint was filed. That argument is inconsistent 
with the provisions of the UCC dealing with the handling of negotiable instruments. 
Here, as in other cases, plaintiff argued that it should be permitted to proceed because it is 
a "real party in interest," noting that New Jersey's rules as to standing are liberal, that the 
plaintiff has established it has some stake in the matter, and that the plaintiff should 
therefore be permitted to proceed without the type of inquiry that would be appropriate 
under the UCC. As is typical, plaintiffs counsel based that argument on the provisions 
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of R 4:26-1, specifically arguing that under that Rule a party need only be a "real party 
in interest" to have standing to proceed. See Mr. Ford's April 22,2010 Letter Brief. That 
argument is misplaced. 
R 4:26-1 does not say that any individual or entity which has some interest in a 
matter has the authority to prosecute the claim. The Rule reads as follows: 
Every action may be prosecuted in the name of the real 
party in interest; but an executor, administrator, guardian of 
a person or property, trustee of an express trust or a party 
with whom or in whose name a contract has been made for 
the benefit of another may sue in a fiduciary's own name 
without joining the person for whose benefit the suit is 
brought. A trustee of an express trust may be sued without 
joining the beneficiaries of the trust unless it shall 
affirmatively appear in the action that a conflict of interest 
exists between the trustee and the beneficiaries. 
The very first portion of the Rule is permissive, providing that an action may be 
prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest. That portion of the Rule appears to 
contemplate that some actions may be brought in the name of someone other than the real 
party in interest. The next portion of the Rule provides that certain fiduciaries may bring 
an action in their own names, presumably on behalf of the individuals or entities for 
which they act, without joining those individuals or entities in the action. The Rule does 
not suggest that an individual or entity which does not have a fiduciary relationship with 
the real party in interest is authorized to bring an action on behalf of that party, whether 
or not that party is joined. The facts at issue here are illustrative. The complaint in this 
matter was filed in the name of The Bank of New York, as the Indenture Trustee. That is 
consistent with the Rule, assuming the action is proceeding on behalf of the Trust as the 
real party in interest. In essence the Rule permitted the Bank to sue in its own name, on 
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behalf of the Trust, without joining the Trust as a party. The problem presented here, 
however, is more specific. Absent possession of the note, the Trust itself would not have 
the authority to enforce the note or the mortgage under the UCC. It would have been 
inappropriate for the matter to proceed in the name of the Trust or the Trustee until that 
issue was resolved. 
Our case law dealing with the issue of standing is fairly liberal. Classically, 
standing requires that a litigant have a sufficient stake in the matter and real 
adversariness, with a substantial potential for real harm flowing from the outcome of the 
case. See N.J. Chamb. of Commerce v. N.J. Elec. Law Enforce. Comnou 82 N.J. 57, 67 
(1980) and In re New Jersey Bd. Of Public Utilities, 200 N.J. Super. 544, 556 (App. Div. 
1985). By the same token, litigants generally have no standing to assert the rights of third 
parties. See Jersey Shore, Etc. v> Estate of Baum. 84 NJ. 137,144 (1980). This is an 
action to foreclose a mortgage, not to obtain some general determination of the rights of 
those involved. Obviously, there are any number of individuals and entities which have 
an interest in the outcome of this litigation. Presumably that would include all those 
involved in the securitization of the mortgage loans at issue, including the individual 
investors. There is simply no reason to suggest, however, that the action to foreclose 
could be filed by any of the individuals or entities involved in the securitization process. 
In simple terms, this was a dispute over just who has the right to enforce the note 
and the related mortgage. That dispute could not be resolved simply by identifying those 
entities which had some general interest in the outcome of the litigation. It was entirely 
appropriate to require plaintiff to establish it did have the right to enforce the note and 
mortgage. 
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THE RIGHT TO ENFORCEMENT—POSSESSION 
OF THE NOTE AS OF THE DATE OF FILING 
Plaintiff did produce the original note, indorsed in blank, at the time of argument 
on its motion for summary judgment, approximately fourteen months after the complaint 
was filed. It then argued that it should be permitted to proceed with the foreclosure based 
on its current possession of the note, without establishing it had possession as of the date 
the complaint was filed. That argument suggests a number of additional questions. Must 
plaintiff establish that it held the right to enforce the note and mortgage as of the date the 
complaint was filed? What should be done if plaintiff cannot establish it had the right to 
enforce the note and mortgage at the time the complaint is filed but can establish it had 
acquired that right at some subsequent time? 
Obviously, a complaint to foreclose a mortgage should be filed by or on behalf of 
the individual or entity which has the right to enforce the mortgage at the time of the 
filing. That is clearly contemplated by the Rules of Court. See EL 4:64-l(b)(10) 
providing that when the plaintiff is not the original mortgagee or the original nominee 
mortgagee, the complaint must recite "all assignments in the chain of title." See also R. 
4:34-3 dealing with the substitution of parties when interests are transferred during the 
pendency of litigation. There are good reasons for that general rule. 
For a variety of reasons, litigants facing foreclosure should be able to confirm that 
a complaint is properly filed by an individual or entity with the authority to proceed. The 
date of filing can affect substantive rights, and those involved should have the ability to 
confirm that filing was proper. By way of example, the Fair Foreclosure Act, NJ.S.A. 
2A:5G-53, et seq., provides that a debtor's right to cure a default with respect to a 
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residential mortgage, without being responsible for the lender's fees and costs, will end 
when the complaint is filed. See NJ.S.A. 2A:50~56(5), (6) and (7). Similarly, NJ.S.A. 
46:10B-50 now provides that certain borrowers facing foreclosure have the right to a six 
month forbearance, effective with the filing of a foreclosure complaint. In any event, it 
is generally appropriate for one who is seeking the court's assistance in forcing the sale 
of property to proceed with some degree of transparency. 
The issue can arise in a variety of contexts. The problem might be presented, as 
here, in contested litigation. Contested litigation, in turn, might involve a variety of other 
issues, apart from the question of standing. The problem can also arise in uncontested 
matters, generally handled by the Office of Foreclosure. Is it appropriate for the Office of 
Foreclosure to require proofs of the plaintiff's standing as of the date the original 
complaint was filed as a condition of recommending the entry of final judgment? More 
importantly, what remedy is appropriate? Should a plaintiff that did not have the 
authority to proceed as of the date the complaint was filed be permitted to remedy that 
problem by filing an amended complaint? Would the availability of that remedy depend 
on whether defendant had filed a responsive pleading or motion to dismiss prior to the 
time any amended complaint was filed? Alternatively, should the defective complaint be 
subject to dismissal, presumably on terms permitting the filing of a new complaint by one 
with the authority to proceed as of the date of the new filing? Is the remedy dependent on 
the circumstances of the particular case at issue? Those issues are not easily resolved. 
While the Rules of Court do not deal with the matter directly, the courts have had 
occasion to address the general problem in a number of different contexts. 
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There is one opinion which does deal with the issue directly, in the context of 
foreclosure litigation filed in federal court based on diversity jurisdiction. In re 
Foreclosure Cases, 521 F. Supp. 2d 650 (U.S. Dist. 2007) involved a dispute over 
standing and subject matter jurisdiction. The United States District Court concluded that 
to satisfy Article El's standing requirements the plaintiff in a foreclosure action must 
establish that it was the holder of the note and the mortgage at the time the complaint was 
filed. That issue was not clearly resolved on the record presented at the time. The 
plaintiffs were given 30 days to submit proofs that they did have standing and that the 
federal court had diversity jurisdiction as of the date the complaint was filed. If that was 
not done, the complaints at issue were to be dismissed without prejudice to refiling if and 
when the plaintiff acquired standing and when the diversity requirements were met. See 
In re Foreclosure Cases, 521 F. Supp. 2d at 654. That result is consistent with this court's 
analysis of the issue. 
There are no New Jersey cases dealing directly with the issue. There are, 
however, several New Jersey cases which highlight the tension presented in determining 
just what alternative remedy would be appropriate in these circumstances. Under the Fair 
Foreclosure Act, a lender which intends to foreclose a residential mortgage is required to 
serve what is commonly referred to as a Notice of Intention on the mortgage debtor at 
least thirty days before an action is filed. The borrower is given the right to cure any 
existing default, without the payment of the lender's fees and costs, during that interim 
period. See NJ.S.A. 2A:50-56 and N.J.S.A. 2A:50~57. A number of reported opinions 
have addressed the question of just what remedy is appropriate when some defect in 
service of the Notice of Intention is discovered after the complaint is filed. Generally, the 
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question is whether the complaint should be dismissed, or whether the lender should be 
permitted to proceed on terms permitting the service of a new notice, to be given effect in 
the pending action, on terms permitting a cure as if the complaint had not yet been filed. 
The courts have dealt with that dispute in different ways. In GE Capital Mortgage Servs., 
Inc. v. Weisman, 329 N. J.Super. 590 (Ch. Div. 2000) the court permitted a lender which 
was unable to locate records which presumably may have established service of the 
Notice of Intention to cure that problem with the service of a new Notice, without the 
filing of a new action. The Appellate Division appears to have adopted that type of 
remedy in Cho Hung Bank v. Kim, 361 NJ. Super. 331 (App. Div. 2003), a case 
involving apparent deficiencies within a Notice of Intention that had been served, and a 
dispute over whether the statute was applicable to that dispute. In that case, the Appellate 
Division authorized the service of a new Notice, without the dismissal of the underlying 
action. In EMC Mortg. Corp. v. Chaudri, 400 NJ. Super. 126 (App. Div. 2008), however, 
another panel of the Appellate Division subsequently disapproved of that remedy, 
essentially concluding that the underlying legislation required the dismissal of the 
complaint. 
The opinion in Marshall v. Raritan Valley Disp., 398 NJ. Super. 168 (App. Div. 
2008) deals with a similar problem, but in an entirely different context. Marshall was a 
personal injury action involving multiple defendants and disputes over insurance 
coverage. The defendant Township of West Amwell was insured under two separate 
insurance policies. The Public Alliance Insurance Coverage Fund (PAIC) was one of 
those carriers. PAIC defended the action on behalf of West Amwell. In those 
proceedings, a third party action was filed by West .Amwell against Illinois National, the 
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second carrier. PAIC settled the underlying claim. Illinois National then challenged 
West Amwell's standing to the coverage action, essentially arguing that PAIC, and not 
West Amwell, was then the real party in interest. The trial court recognized that PAIC 
was the real party in interest, but rejected that argument that the action had to be 
maintained in the name of PAIC, ultimately entering judgment against Illinois National. 
The Appellate Division reversed, finding that West Amwell did not have standing to 
pursue the coverage dispute once PAIC had paid the claim. It then addressed the 
question of whether the third party complaint should be dismissed, or whether the matter 
could proceed through the substitution of PAIC as the third-party plaintiff. The Appellate 
Division's analysis focused on the provisions of EL 4:34-3 which provides that where 
there has been a transfer of interest, the action may proceed by or against the original 
party, unless the court directs a substitution. The Appellate Division permitted that matter 
to proceed through a substitution, but noted the court had substantial discretion in 
implementing the Rule. Those issues were addressed in the following language. 
This view of the federal counterpart to Rule 4:34-3 could 
support the conclusion that the substitution of PAIC for 
West Amwell as third-party plaintiff is not authorized by 
Rule 4:34-3 because of the previously discussed differences 
between West Amwell's and PAIC's coverage claims 
against Illinois National. However, both the trial court and 
the parties have already invested substantial time and 
resources in adjudicating those claims. Moreover, both of 
West Amwell's and PAIC's claims derive from the same 
coverage provisions of the Illinois National Policy and, like 
its federal counterpart and the predecessor New Jersey 
court rule, Rule 4:34-4 vests substantial discretion in the 
court to determine whether substitution would be 
appropriate under the circumstances of a partitular case. 
See Morris M.Schnitzer & Julius Wildstein, New Jersey 
Rules Service: 1954 to 1967. comment 7 on RJL 4:38-3. 
Therefore, we conclude that the interests of efficient 
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judicial administration would be served by allowing PAIC 
to substitute for West Amwell as the third-party plaintiff 
rather than requiring PAIC to file a separate action against 
Illinois National. 
Marshall 398 NJ. Super at 180-181. 
This court is not convinced the provisions of R. 4:34-3 were intended to apply to 
the circxmistances presented here. The problem presented here did not relate to a transfer 
of interests from the plaintiff identified in the complaint to some other entity, after the 
complaint was filed. The issue here is whether the plaintiff identified in the complaint 
was the proper party at the time the complaint was filed. Nevertheless, the type of 
analysis suggested by the opinion in Marshall appears appropriate here. Where the 
plaintiff did not have the right to proceed as of the date of the initial filing, dismissal may 
be an appropriate remedy. The propriety of that remedy, however, will have to be 
addressed on a case by case basis. One focus of any analysis would be the time and 
effort devoted to the prior litigation, and the amount of duplication of effort that might be 
required if a new action is filed, both on the part of the parties and the court. 
As a routine matter, any complaint for foreclosure should be filed in the name of 
the individual or entity with the authority to enforce the underlying debt. In actions 
involving a negotiable note, plaintiff should generally be in a position to establish that it 
did have possession of the note as of the date the complaint was filed as required by the 
UCC. Where that cannot be established, the complaint may be subject to dismissal, 
without prejudice to the filing of a new action. There is simply no reason for this court to 
disregard the substantive provisions of the UCC. Equity follows the law. See Dunkin' 
Donuts of America Inc. v. Middletown Donut Corp., 100 K I 166, 183-185 (1985). 
36 
Whether any particular action should in fact be dismissed should be addressed on 
a case to case basis, dependent upon all the circumstances. As a general matter, dismissal 
will probably be appropriate, if only to provide a clear incentive to plaintiffs to see that 
the issue of standing is properly addressed before any complaint is filed. There maybe 
cases, however, where dismissal would not be appropriate. That may be the case if the 
defendant fails to raise the issue promptly, or when substantial time and effort may have 
been devoted to addressing other matters that would then have to be revisited in any new 
litigation. Those circumstances were not presented here. Defendant did raise the standing 
issue promptly. The parties were not required to litigate other issues. Plaintiffs right to 
proceed turned on plaintiff's ability to establish that it did have possession of the note at 
the time the original complaint was filed. That issue was ultimately addressed at trial. 
TRIAL—PROOF OF POSSESSION, 
PRESUMPTIONS 
Trial was conducted to address the standing issue in June 2010. Plaintiff 
presented the testimony of Mr. Mitchell, a Vice President of The Bank of New York, 
whose certification had been submitted in support of the prior motion. No other 
witnesses were presented by either party. Mr. Mitchell had been employed by The Bank 
of New York since sometime in 2002. He had been involved in the securitization of the 
American Home Acceptance mortgage loans at issue. He confirmed that he did attend 
the closing on the loans at issue, that the closing did occur December 21, 2004, and that 
he was the individual who signed the documents at issue for The Bank of New York at 
that closing. He was also able to identify a Mortgage Loan Schedule maintained by The 
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Bank of New York with respect to the particular securitization at issue, which did refer to 
the specific loan at issue here. He was unable, however, to confirm that the Mortgage 
Loan Schedule he produced would have been the same as any of the various Schedules 
referred to in either the Mortgage Loan Purchase Agreement, the Indenture or a separate 
Custodial Agreement referred to in other documentation. Indeed, the form of the 
Schedule did not appear to provide the information that was to be referenced in the 
Schedule which was to accompany the Indenture, which presumably would have been the 
Schedule available to The Bank of New York. Mr. Mitchell did confirm that The Bank of 
New York considered the loan at issue here to be an asset of the Trust from the time of 
the original securitization in 2004. He also confirmed it was an industry practice to have 
the documents involved reviewed over a period of months prior to any actual closing. 
Notably, Mr. Mitchell's testimony indicated that approximately 11,000 loans had been 
securitized as a part of this process. 
Mr. Mitchell was unable to offer any direct proof as to the physical transfer of the 
note at issue in this matter. The securitization documents did indicate that American 
Home Securities, as Seller, was to deliver a variety of documents related to individual 
mortgage loans to Deutsche Bank, as Custodian, which were then to be reviewed by the 
Custodian as a part of the securitization process. The documents to be reviewed were to 
include the original mortgage notes, with appropriate endorsements. See Section 2.03 of 
the Indenture providing for a review to be completed no later than 180 days after the 
closing, and Section 2.01(b)(i) to (vi) of the Mortgage Loan Purchase Agreement, 
identifying the documents which were to be deposited and reviewed. It was apparently 
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intended that the notes would be delivered to Deutsche Bank in appropriate form, and 
that Deutsche Bank would confirm that had been done. 
Mr. Mitchell, however, was not in a position to testify as to what had actually 
occurred. Deutsche Bank's operations were apparently handled in a separate facility, far 
from Mr. Mitchell's office. Mr. Mitchell would not have been present when any 
documents were received or reviewed. He simply was not in a position to confirm, based 
on his own observations, what was done with the original note. No competent proofs 
were offered as to when the note was endorsed, when the note was delivered to Deutsche 
Bank, and whether it had been endorsed prior to that time. Indeed, there were no 
meaningful proofs offered as to just what had been done with the note prior to the time it 
was delivered to plaintiff's counsel around the time the motion for summary judgment 
,was argued. 
Plaintiff continued to argue that it was entitled to proceed with the foreclosure 
based on its ability to produce the note during the litigation, without establishing that it 
had possession as of the date of the complaint. Plaintiff also attempted to establish that 
the note had in fact been transferred before the complaint was filed in two separate ways. 
First, plaintiff offered an additional document intended to establish that Deutsche Bank, 
as Custodian, had received and reviewed the notes which were being securitized, and had 
confirmed they were in proper form, sometime on or before the closing date. That 
document, marked Exhibit "P-24," was in the form of a letter, captioned "Form of Initial 
Certification," dated December 21,2004. The letter was addressed to The Bank of New 
York, American Home Servicing and GMAC Mortgage Corporation. It referenced a 
Custodial Agreement and sections of the Indenture and the Mortgage Loan Purchase 
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Agreement. (The Custodial Agreement was not provided at trial.) The letter recited that 
the files for each Mortgage Loan on the Mortgage Loan Schedule had been reviewed, that 
the documents required were in the Custodian's possession and that the documents 
"appear to be regular on their face," except as referenced on an exception report. (There 
were several additional documents attached to the letter, including one document 
captioned Exception Report Summary. While there was no specific reference to the loan 
at issue here in that document, the document itself was difficult to understand. It appears 
to list thousands of "exceptions" without relating those exceptions to specific loans.) The 
letter was signed by one Andrew Hays, referred to simply as an "Associate" of Deutsche 
Bank. It did not indicate whether Mr. Hays himself had reviewed any portion of the 
11,000 files that would have been at issue, or how he would have obtained information as 
to reviews conducted by other individuals. The letter was obviously intended to establish 
the truth of the matters stated. Plaintiff was unable to establish that it could be admitted 
into evidence as a business record. See NJ.R.E. 803(c)(6). Its contents have not been 
considered as a part of this analysis. 
Second, plaintiff argued that under the circumstances presented it was entitled to a 
presumption that it was in possession of the note at the time the complaint was filed, 
based on its ability to produce the original note at the time of argument and trial. That 
argument was based on the 1935 opinion of the Court of Errors and Appeals in Dolin v. 
Darnell 115 NJ.L. 508 (E. & A. 1935), which in turn cited the 1872 opinion of the 
Supreme Court of Michigan in Hovev v. Sebring, 24 Mich. 232 (1872). Those cases can 
be cited for the proposition that the production of a note at the time of trial raises the 
presumption that plaintiff was authorized to prosecute the matter at the time suit was 
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filed. This court, however, was not convinced that plaintiff was entitled to the type of 
presumption suggested under the facts presented here or that the presumption, if 
available, would resolve the issue. The opinions in both Dolin and Hovev acknowledge 
that the person attempting to enforce the provisions of a note must generally be in 
possession of the note as of the date the action to collect is filed. In Dolin, the payee on 
two promissory notes had received payment. The dispute presented was whether the 
payment was intended to satisfy the notes, or whether the individual who had made the 
payment had simply purchased the notes, intending to pursue the right to collection. It 
was stipulated at trial that the plaintiff did not have possession of the notes until long 
after the case was filed. The opinion deals with the question of whether the plaintiff could 
be considered a "holder" or a "bearer" as of the time the complaint was filed, pursuant to 
the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Act in effect at the time. It was determined that 
plaintiff could not proceed. The case was dismissed by the trial court and the Court of 
Errors and Appeals affirmed. Any presumption that may have arisen from the production 
of the notes at trial was of no moment to the ultimate result. Hovev addressed the 
question of whether the maker of the note at issue should be permitted to challenge the 
plaintiffs right to proceed at trial. The plaintiff had testified that he was the "owner" of 
the note. The trial court did not permit the defendant to question the plaintiff about that 
claim. The Supreme Court of Michigan concluded that the trial court erred and reversed. 
Again, any presumption that may have existed was of no moment. Indeed, the holding in 
Hovey does suggest that a defendant who challenges a plaintiffs standing may present 
that challenge by attacking the plaintiff's proofs. 
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The opinion in Dolin refers to Hovey as "the leading and frequently cited case," 
reproducing the following passage from that opinion: 
It is well settled, as a general rule, that the possession of 
such note by the plaintiff producing it on the trial, is prima 
facie evidence of his title, or his right to sue upon it, and 
that the plaintiff need not be the real or beneficial owner to 
entitle him to recover. And liberal as the law is to the 
person in whose name the suit may be brought, and in 
presuming ownership from possession, we think it has not 
gone, and ought not to go, so far as to allow a party to bring 
an action before his right of action has accrued: and 
whatever may be the state of facts which authorizes the suit 
to be brought in the name of any particular person, must, as 
a general rule, exist at the time the suit is instituted in his 
name. This, it is true would, in ordinary cases, be presumed 
from the production of the note by the plaintiff on the trial 
but the defendant, we think, may rebut this presumption, 
and defeat the action by showing that the state of facts 
existing at the time of the institution of the suit hot 
authorize the plaintiff to sue. The plaintiff can only recover 
upon the cause of action he had at the institution of his suit, 
and he is not allowed to sue first and obtain his cause of 
action afterwards. 
Dolin, 115 N.J.L, at 514-515 (emphasis added). 
There are different types of presumptions. Logical presumptions depend for their 
validity on the fact that there is an empirically demonstrable probability that, as a matter 
of common experience, the presumed fact flows from the underlying fact. Artificial 
presumptions, on the other hand, may be based on considerations of public policy. See 
Lionshead Woods v. Kaplan Bros., 243 NJ. Super. 678, 682-683 (Law Div, 1990). 
Courts are generally reluctant to create presumptions. See Avemco Ins. Co. v. United 
49 
States Fire Ins. Co., 212 N.J. Super. 38,46 (App. Div. 1986). Presumptions may also 
become outdated as the law changes. See Troy v. Rutgers, 168 NJ. 354, 365-366 (2001). 
Both Dolin and Hovey suggest there are substantial limits to any presumption that 
might arise out of a plaintiffs ability to estabUsh his possession of a note sometime after 
a complaint has been filed. Each opinion recognizes that the presumption would be 
available "in ordinary cases." Each also recognizes the more basic principle involved— 
that one seeking to enforce a note should be in possession as of the date the action is 
filed. Notably, neither case involved the type of relief requested here, involving a request 
for foreclosure. In any event, it would be difficult to conclude that this is an "ordinary" 
case, as that term was used in those prior opinions. More generally, it would be difficult 
to conclude that the presumption suggested should be available in cases involving the 
securitization of mortgage loans with all the complexity attendant on that process. In any 
event, this court was not convinced the presumption at issue should be applied to limit 
defendant's ability to challenge plaintiff's standing. To the contrary, given the 
circumstances presented here, this court was satisfied it was generally appropriate to 
require the plaintiff to establish that it did have possession of the note as of the date the 
complaint was filed. Given all the circumstances, that does not appear to be an 
unreasonable burden to impose on a plaintiff requesting the equitable remedy of 
foreclosure, to force the sale of a defendant's property to obtain payment of a debt. 
The inapplicability of the presumption sought by plaintiff does not resolve the 
factual issue presented at trial—considering all the proofs, was plaintiff able to establish 
that it did have possession of the note at the time the complaint was filed? As noted, 
plaintiff was not able to offer any direct proofs on that issue. Each party, however, 
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argued that the issue should be resolved in its or his favor based on a number of 
conflicting inferences suggested by the specific proofs and the general circumstances 
presented. Plaintiffs arguments focused on the documents created as a part of the 
securitization process. Those documents were admitted into evidence at trial, based on 
Mr. Mitchell's testimony. While plaintiff was never able to present the Mortgage Loan 
Schedule that should have been attached to the Mortgage Loan Purchase Agreement, it 
was able to present a separate schedule maintained by The Bank of New York, which did 
refer to defendant's loan. From all the proofs presented, the court was satisfied that 
defendant's loan was among the loans which were securitized in 2004. The securitization 
documents did provide that the Custodian was to review the files for each mortgage loan, 
to confirm that each file contained the documents required, including the original note for 
each loan. From those circumstances, plaintiff argued the court could infer that the 
review occurred sometime in or around 2004 or 2005, that the file for defendant's loan 
was included in that review, and that the Custodian must then have located the original 
note in the file, appropriately endorsed. That inference is not illogical. It was considered. 
Defendant offered other arguments, suggesting the proofs presented by plaintiff 
were suspect, and that other contradictory inferences would be appropriate. Given all the 
circumstances presented, it was entirely appropriate to question the reliability of the 
materials submitted by plaintiff. The provisions of plaintiff s original complaint referring 
to the plaintiff as having become the owner of the note and mortgage "before the 
complaint was filed" did not comply with the provision of EL 4:64-l(b)(10) and was 
arguably evasive. The MERS assignment was potentially misleading. Plaintiff was never 
able to explain, in any meaningful way, why it was unable to locate the Mortgage Loan 
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Schedule that should have been attached to the Mortgage Loan Purchase Agreement, or 
why it had taken so long to respond the court's prior requests for the production of 
documents. Plaintiff was clearly on notice that the court intended to address the question 
of whether it had possession of the note as of the date the complaint was filed at trial, but 
was unable to produce any meaningful proof on the issue. Plaintiff failed to present a 
witness from the Custodian, or even an appropriate business record that might have been 
maintained by the Custodian to confirm just what had occurred when the mortgage loan 
files were to be reviewed. There was also no explanation of just how plaintiffs counsel 
had come into possession of the original note. In the absence of such proofs, defendant 
argued, the court could infer that the review contemplated by the securitization process 
had not occurred, or that plaintiff was simply unable to establish that it had. Those 
potential inferences were also logical, and were considered. 
This was a factual dispute. Plaintiff was required to establish one basic tact—that 
as of the time the complaint was filed, it or its agent did have possession of the note on 
which the action was based. This court was satisfied the burden of proof on that issue 
rested with plaintiff, and the plaintiff was required to carry that burden by a 
preponderance of the evidence. Having considered all of the evidence presented, as well 
as the inferences argued, the court was satisfied that the proofs on that issue were in 
equipoise. Plaintiff failed to convince the court, even by the preponderance of the 
evidence standard, that it did have possession of the note as of the date the complaint was 
filed. Accordingly, the complaint has been dismissed without prejudice to plaintiffs right 
to institute a new action, provided that any new complaint must be accompanied by a 
certification confirming that plaintiff is then in possession of the original note. 
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ASSIGNMENTS, THE COURT RULES AND 
MOTION PRACTICE 
One would assume that in most circumstances a dispute over a plaintiffs right to 
proceed with a complaint for foreclosure could be resolved fairly quickly and efficiently. 
Obviously, that did not occur here. In the end, that was largely the result of plaintiff s 
failure to address the matter directly, both in the original and amended complaint and in 
the various submissions related to the prior motion for summary judgment. While the 
legal issues may appear complex, the factual issues are fairly focused, even in those cases 
involving the securitization of the debt and the handling of negotiable notes. When and 
how was the debt transferred to plaintiff? Did the plaintiff have possession of the 
underlying note as of the date the complaint was filed? Given the amount of time devoted 
to the matter, that problem deserves some additional discussion. 
The courts have attempted to require some degree of transparency in foreclosure 
litigation. That is appropriate for several reasons. Obviously, a litigant facing 
foreclosure has the right to understand the basis upon which a plaintiff is proceeding. 
When the issue is not clearly addressed, trial courts may be required to devote some 
substantial time and effort in resolving these types of disputes. In addition, court staff, 
particularly in the Office of Foreclosure, are required to confirm the circumstances 
presented in processing requests for the entry of judgment. See R. 1:34-6. 
R. 4:64 deals with the type of disclosure required of plaintiffs in a number of 
ways, dealing both with the contents of the foreclosure complaint and the materials which 
must be submitted with an application for judgment. In each case, the applicable section 
of the Rule deals with the need to disclose "assignments," a term which can be 
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problematic. R. 4:64-2(a) deals with applications for judgment, requiring that those 
applications include "the original mortgage, evidence of indebtedness, assignments, claim 
of hen, and any other original documents upon which a claim is based." (emphasis 
supplied) EL 4:64-1(b) deals with the contents of the complaint, requiring the recitation 
of a great deal of information. R 4:64-l(b)(10) is the subsection of the Rule apparently 
intended to deal with prior transfers from the original mortgagee. Again, the Rule deals 
with the matter by reference to potential assignments. That subsection of the Rule reads 
as follows: 
The complaint shall state .. .(10) if the plaintiff is not the 
original mortgagee or the original nominee mortgagee the 
names of the original mortgagee and a recital of all 
assignments in the chain of title, (emphasis supplied) 
R4:64-l(b)(10). 
The term "assignment" can have several meanings. The term can be used to refer 
to the actual transfer of an interest from one individual or entity to another. 
Alternatively, the term can be used to refer to the document which is issued to reflect that 
transfer. See Black's Law Dictionary 136 (9th ed. 20091 The use of that term in these 
types of circumstances can be confusing. 
The enforcement of R 4:64-l(b)(10) has been problematic both for the trial courts 
and the Office of Foreclosure. That general problem is evident here, in a variety of ways. 
The original complaint in this matter was filed in February 2009. The plaintiff identified 
in the complaint was not the original mortgagee. There was no meaningful attempt to 
comply with the provisions of JL 4:64-l(b)(10) by "reciting all assignments in the chain 
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of title." The complaint simply recited that plaintiff had become the owner of the note 
and mortgage "before the within complaint was drafted." 
The MERS assignment was not executed and recorded until after the initial 
complaint was filed. Presumably that was done to create a public record of the transfer, 
in anticipation of the foreclosure being instituted in the name of plaintiff. By its own 
terms, the document recites that MERS "does hereby .... assign, transfer, convey, set 
over and deliver" the mortgage and "the money due or to become due" to plaintiff. That 
language suggests that the actual transfer was effected through the execution of the 
document itself Similarly, the amended complaint, filed in May 2009, was apparently 
intended to suggest that the transfer of the debt was effected through the execution of the 
MERS assignment. The execution of the MERS assignment and the reference to that 
assignment in the amended complaint was, at best, confusing. (As an aside, the execution 
and recording of a written assignment are not essential to a transferee's right to proceed. 
Agreements to transfer interests in real estate can be enforced, even if they are not in 
writing. See N.J.S.A. 25:1-13 (permitting the enforcement of an oral agreement to 
transfer an interest in real estate, provided the proofs establish such an agreement by clear 
and convincing evidence). Assignments without writings will be effective in equity. See 1 
Nelson & Whitman, Real Estate Finance Law 5.28 n.3 (3d. ed. 1993). While a written 
assignment may be recorded, it is presumably enforceable between the parties to the 
assignment, irrespective of its recording.) 
To the extent the recording of the MERS assignment was somehow intended to 
deal with the requirements of Rule 4:64-1 (b)(10), one can ask whether the Rule, as 
currently phrased, is effective. Was the Rule intended simply to require that a plaintiff 
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recite the history of recorded assignments, as suggested by the Rule's reference to "the 
chain of title?" Should the Rule be interpreted more broadly to require the disclosure of 
all transfers of interests in the mortgage and the underlying debt? Should the Rule be 
amended to address those issues? Should the Rules require more specific disclosure when 
a mortgage loan has been securitized, or when the matter involves the handling of a 
negotiable note, where possession is essential to one's ability to proceed? See also R 
4:64-l(b)(l 1), requiring that the complaint recite "the names of all parties in interest 
whose interest is subordinate or affected by the mortgage foreclosure action." 
Separate issues are presented when the matter involves the enforcement of a 
negotiable instrument. Should the rules require that the complaint specifically recite that 
plaintiff is in possession of the note, as of the date the complaint is filed? Should plaintiff 
be required to disclose the physical location of the note, as of the date the complaint is 
filed? 
Perhaps the Rules of Court should be modified to provide for more specific 
disclosure. Any revision to the Rules would have to be addressed in another forum. This 
court, however, does have the ability to determine just how the issues noted will be 
addressed in the contested matters assigned to it, which are all actively managed. In that 
context, this court anticipates it will require the types of disclosures contemplated above 
in all proceedings in which there is a challenge to plaintiffs standing. There is no 
apparent reason why a plaintiff should not be expected to provide competent proofs as to 
the location of the note promptly, as soon as the issue is joined. 
Our Rules recognize the need to identify those issues which are truly in dispute in 
a variety of ways. See R. 4:46-2 (dealing with the standard to be applied in dealing with 
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motions for summary judgment), Rule l:l-2(a) (permitting the relaxation of the rules to 
avoid an injustice), NJ.R.E. 101(a)(4) (permitting undisputed facts to be proved by any 
relevant evidence) and RPC 3.1 (prohibiting a lawyer from pursuing frivolous claims). 
As a routine matter, plaintiffs attorneys should be prepared to confirm whether the 
underlying obligation is evidenced by a negotiable note. If that is the case, plaintiffs will 
be expected to confirm that the note was in the possession of the plaintiff at the time the 
original complaint was filed, and just where the note is being held. 
In those cases where the loan was securitized, additional disclosure should be 
provided as a matter of course. Plaintiff should be prepared to provide the underlying 
documentation reflecting the securitization process, with a meaningful analysis of just 
how the debt was transferred to the plaintiff. Copies of any loan purchase agreements, 
pooling arid servicing agreements or any other agreements which provide for the transfer 
of the debt are to be provided, with copies of the applicable schedules identifying the 
particular loan at issue. Depending on the circumstances, it may be possible to redact 
portions of the documents or schedules being provided, particularly when the underlying 
documents were previously provided in discovery. The information and documentation 
noted should be provided with a competent certification executed by an officer or 
employee of the plaintiff. Certifications from plaintiffs' counsel will generally not be 
adequate. (It is possible that in a given case, the original note may have been delivered to 
plaintiffs counsel, either before or during the litigation. Where that has occurred, a 
certification from someone associated with the law firm may be appropriate. Counsel 
should be sensitive, however, to problems presented where lawyers become potential 
witnesses. See RPC 3.7.) All of that information and documentation should be made 
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available to defendants as soon as the standing issue is joined, to permit legitimate 
disputes regarding standing to be addressed promptly and efficiently. Obviously, any 
motion for summary judgment dealing with the issue of standing, should also be 
accompanied by proofs focusing on the issues discussed in this opinion. With 
appropriate proofs focused on possession of the note as of the date of complaint it should 
not be difficult for a plaintiff to establish its right to proceed. Conversely, it may be 
entirely appropriate to bar a plaintiff who has not been able to present those proofs from 
proceeding, without the need for extended proceedings. 
PREDATORY LENDING, THE SERVICER 
AS PLAINTIFF 
There are a number of issues that are not addressed in this opinion which deserve 
some brief comment. 
First, this case does not involve substantive defenses or affirmative claims, aside 
from the issue of standing. The defendants in this case have been involved in other 
litigation in this court. They are sophisticated investors who elected to speculate in the 
development of real estate. There is no indication they did not understand the terms on 
which the funds in question where borrowed, or the fact that the real estate was pledged 
as security and was ultimately subject to foreclosure. Aside from the dispute as to 
standing, defendant Krywopusk has no defense to the foreclosure itself. 
If the matter did involve other claims or defenses, a variety of additional disputes 
might be presented requiring additional inquiries into the manner by which the 
underlying debt was transferred to plaintiff. By way of example, a plaintiff will typically 
defend a predatory lending claim by asserting it is a holder in due course, entitled to 
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specific protections under the Uniform Commercial Code. An assignee who is a holder in 
due course would hold the debt free of most, but not all, defenses which might be 
asserted against the original lender. One's status as a holder in due course, however, is 
dependent on a number of circumstances. The note must be negotiable and must have 
been negotiated. Negotiation, in turn, would require a transfer of possession and the 
endorsement of the note. To be a holder in due course, the assignee must have taken the 
instrument (1) for value, (2) in good faith, and (3) without notice of any defense or of the 
debt being overdue. A dispute over whether an assignee is a holder in due course, taking 
the debt free of potential defenses, may require a much more detailed inquiry into the 
date of the transfer and negotiation and the circumstances surrounding the transfer. See 
29 New Jersey Practice, Law of Mortgage 11.5 at 774-790 (Myron C. Weinstein) (2d ed. 
2001), N.J.S.A. 12A:3-104, N.J.S.A. 12A:3-20l(b), NJ.S.A. 12A:3-203(c), N.J.S.A. 
12A:3-302(a), and New Jersey Mortgage & Investment Corp. v. Calvetti 68 N.J. Super. 
18 (App. Div. 1961). It is entirely conceivable that the plaintiff in this matter would not 
have the status of a holder in due course and would therefore be subject to any number of 
specific defenses that might have been asserted against the original lender. This is not a 
case, however, which involves the types of defenses which would require an inquiry as to 
plaintiffs status as a holder in due course. 
In addition, this opinion does not address the issues arising from when an original 
negotiable note is lost. In those circumstances, additional inquiries would be required. 
See N. ISA. 12A3-301 and NJ.S.A. 12A:3~309. 
Finally, this opinion also does not address the question of whether an action to 
foreclose can be brought in the name of a servicer. Foreclosure complaints are 
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sometimes filed in the name of the servicer, rather than in the name of the entity for 
which the loan is being serviced. That can occur whether or not the underlying loan has 
been securitized. If the mortgage being foreclosed is based on a negotiable note, a 
number of additional inquiries may be necessary. Has the note been delivered to the 
servicer, making it a holder or a non holder in possession with the right to enforce? If not, 
could the matter proceed in the name of the servicer, as the agent of the holder or 
nonholder in possession? Those issues are not presented here. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant's attack on plaintiff's ability to proceed with the foreclosure based on 
the alleged "separation" of the note an mortgage was rejected. Plaintiff, however, failed 
to establish that it was entitled to enforce the note as of the time the complaint was filed. 
In this case, there are no compelling reasons to permit plaintiff to proceed in this action. 
Accordingly, the complaint has been dismissed. That dismissal is without prejudice to 
plaintiff's right to institute a new action to foreclose at any time, provided that any new 
complaint must be accompanied by an appropriate certification, executed by one with 
personal knowledge of the circumstances, confirming that plaintiff is in possession of the 
original note as of the date any new action is filed. That certification must indicate the 
physical location of the note and the name of the individual or entity in possession. 
An appropriate order has been entered 
w 
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UMTS, J. 
ter foreclosing on two properties and purchasing the properties back at the foreclosure sales, U.S. 
ink National Association (U.S.Bank), as trustee for the Structured Asset Securities Corporation 
^rtgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2006-Z; and Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (Wells Fargo), as 
jstee for ABFC 2005-OPT 1 Trust, ABFC Asset Backed Certificates, Series 2005-OPT 1 (plaintiffs) 
3d separate complaints in the Land Court asking a judge to declare that they held clear tit le to the 
Dperties in fee simple. We agree with the judge that the plaintiffs, who were not the original 
>rtgagees, failed to make the required showing that they were the holders of the mortgages at the 
ne of foreclosure. As a result, they did not demonstrate that the foreclosure sales were valid to 
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convey title to the subject properties, and their requests for a declaration of clear title were 
properly denied. [FN5] 
Procedural history. On July 5, 2007, U.S. Bank, as trustee, foreclosed on the mortgage of Antonio 
Ibanez, and purchased the Ibanez property at the foreclosure sale. On the same day, Wells Fargo, 
as trustee, foreclosed on the mortgage of Mark and Tammy LaRace, and purchased the LaRace 
property at that foreclosure sale. 
In September and October of 2008, U.S. Bank and Wells Fargo brought separate actions in the Land 
Court under G.L c. 240, § 6, which authorizes actions "to quiet or establish the title to land situated 
in the commonwealth or to remove a cloud from the title thereto." The two complaints sought 
identical relief: (1) a judgment that the right, title, and interest of the mortgagor (Ibanez or the 
LaRaces) in the property was extinguished by the foreclosure; (2) a declaration that there was no 
cloud on title arising from publication of the notice of sale in the Boston Globe; and (3) a declaration 
that title was vested in the plaintiff trustee in fee simple. U.S. Bank and Wells Fargo each asserted 
in its complaint that it had become the holder of the respective mortgage through an assignment 
made after the foreclosure sale. 
In both cases, the mortgagors--Ibanez and the LaRaces--did not initially answer the complaints, and 
the plaintiffs moved for entry of default judgment. In their motions for entry of default judgment, the 
plaintiffs addressed two issues: (1) whether the Boston Globe, in which the required notices of the 
foreclosure sales were published, is a newspaper of "general circulation" in Springfield, the town 
where the foreclosed properties lay. See G.L. c. 244, § 14 (requiring publication every week for three 
weeks in newspaper published in town where foreclosed property lies, or of general circulation in that 
town); and (2) whether the plaintiffs were legally entitled to foreclose on the properties where the 
assignments of the mortgages to the plaintiffs were neither executed nor recorded in the registry of 
deeds until after the foreclosure sales. [FN6] The two cases were heard together by the Land Court, 
along with a third case that raised the same issues. 
On March 26, 2009, judgment was entered against the plaintiffs. The judge ruled that the 
foreclosure sales were invalid because, in violation of G.L. c. 244, § 14, the notices of the 
foreclosure sales named U.S. Bank (in the Ibanez foreclosure) and Wells Fargo (in the LaRace 
foreclosure) as the mortgage holders where they had not yet been assigned the mortgages. [FN7] 
The judge found, based on each plaintiffs assertions in its complaint, that the plaintiffs acquired the 
mortgages by assignment only after the foreclosure sales and thus had no interest in the mortgages 
being foreclosed at the time of the publication of the notices of sale or at the time of the 
foreclosure sales. 
[FN8] 
The plaintiffs then moved to vacate the judgments. At a hearing on the motions on April 17, 2009, 
the plaintiffs conceded that each complaint alleged a postnotice, postforeclosure sale assignment of 
the mortgage at issue, but they now represented to the judge that documents might exist that 
could show a prenotice, preforeclosure sale assignment of the mortgages. The judge granted the 
plaintiffs leave to produce such documents, provided they were produced in the form they existed in 
at the time the foreclosure sale was noticed and conducted. In response, the plaintiffs submitted 
hundreds of pages of documents to the judge, which they claimed established that the mortgages 
had been assigned to them before the foreclosures. Many of these documents related to the 
:reation of the securitized mortgage pools in which the Ibanez and LaRace mortgages were 
Durportedly included. [FN9] 
The judge denied the plaintiffs1 motions to vacate judgment on October 14, 2009, concluding that 
:he newly submitted documents did not alter the conclusion that the plaintiffs were not the holders 
)f the respective mortgages at the time of foreclosure. We granted the parties1 applications for 
lirect appellate review. 
-actual background. We discuss each mortgage separately, describing when appropriate what- th& 
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plaintiffs allege to have happened and what the documents in the record demonstrate. [FN10] 
The Ibanez mortgage. On December 1, 2005, Antonio Ibanez took out a $103,500 loan for the 
purchase of property at 20 Crosby Street in Springfield, secured by a mortgage to the lender, Rose 
Mortgage, Inc. (Rose Mortgage). The mortgage was recorded the following day. Several days later, 
Rose Mortgage executed an assignment of this mortgage in blank, that is, an assignment that did 
not specify the name of the assignee. [FNl l ] The blank space in the assignment was at some point 
stamped with the name of Option One Mortgage Corporation (Option One) as the assignee, and that 
assignment was recorded on June 7, 2006. Before the recording, on January 23, 2006, Option One 
executed an assignment of the Ibanez mortgage in blank. 
According to U.S. Bank, Option One assigned the Ibanez mortgage to Lehman Brothers Bank, FSB, 
which assigned it to Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc., which then assigned it to the Structured Asset 
Securities Corporation, [FN12] which then assigned the mortgage, pooled with approximately 1,220 
Dther mortgage loans, to U.S. Bank, as trustee for the Structured Asset Securities Corporation 
Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2006-Z. With this last assignment, the Ibanez and other 
oans were pooled into a trust and converted into mortgage-backed securities that can be bought 
and sold by investors--a process known as securitization. 
:or ease of reference, the chain of entities through which the Ibanez mortgage allegedly passed 
>efore the foreclosure sale is: 
Rose Mortgage, Inc. (originator) 
« A r r o w D n » 
Option One Mortgage Corporation (record holder) 
« A r r o w D n » 
Lehman Brothers Bank, FSB 
« A r r o w D n » 
Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. (seller) 
« A r r o w D n » 
Structured Asset Securities Corporation (depositor) 
« A r r o w D n » 
U.S. Bank National Association, as trustee for the Structured Asset Securities 
Corporation Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2006-Z 
ccording to U.S. Bank, the assignment of the Ibanez mortgage to U.S. Bank occurred pursuant to a 
scember 1, 2006, trust agreement, which is not in the record. What is in the record is the private 
acement memorandum (PPM)f dated December 26, 2006, a 273-page, unsigned offer of mortgage-
acked securities to potential investors. The PPM describes the mortgage pools and the entities 
volved, and summarizes the provisions of the trust agreement, including the representation that 
ortgages "will be" assigned into the trust. According to the PPM, ,f[e]ach transfer of a Mortgage 
>an from the Seller [Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc.] to the Depositor [Structured Asset Securities 
)rporation] and from the Depositor to the Trustee [U.S. Bank] will be intended to be a sale of that 
Drtgage Loan and will be reflected as such in the Sale and Assignment Agreement and the Trust 
jreement, respectively." The PPM also specifies that "[e]ach Mortgage Loan will be identified in a 
hedule appearing as an exhibit to the Trust Agreement." However, U.S. Bank did not provide the 
dge with any mortgage schedule identifying the Ibanez loan as among the mortgages that were 
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assigned in the trust agreement. 
On April 17, 2007, U.S. Bank filed a complaint to foreclose on the Ibanez mortgage in the Land Court 
under the Servicemembers Civil Relief Act (Servicemembers Act), which restricts foreclosures against 
active duty members of the uniformed sen/ices. See 50 U.S.C. Appendix §§ 501, 511, 533 (2006 & 
Supp. I I 2008). [FN13] In the complaint, U.S. Bank represented that it was the "owner (or assignee) 
and holder" of the mortgage given by Ibanez for the property. A judgment issued on behalf of U.S. 
Bank on June 26, 2007, declaring that the mortgagor was not entitled to protection from foreclosure 
under the Servicemembers Act. In June, 2007, U.S. Bank also caused to be published in the Boston 
Globe the notice of the foreclosure sale required by G.L. c. 244, § 14. The notice identified U.S. Bank 
as the "present holder" of the mortgage. 
At the foreclosure sale on July 5, 2007, the Ibanez property was purchased by U.S. EJank, as trustee 
for the securitization trust, for $94,350, a value significantly less than the outstanding debt and the 
estimated market value of the property. The foreclosure deed (from U.S. Bank, trustee, as the 
purported holder of the mortgage, to U.S. Bank, trustee, as the purchaser) and the statutory 
foreclosure affidavit were recorded on May 23, 2008. On September 2, 2008, more than one year 
after the sale, and more than five months after recording of the sale, American Home Mortgage 
Servicing, Inc., "as successor-in-interest" to Option One, which was until then the record holder of 
the Ibanez mortgage, executed a written assignment of that mortgage to U.S. Bank, as trustee for 
the securitization trust. [FN14] This assignment was recorded on September 11, 2008. 
The LaRace mortgage. On May 19, 2005, Mark and Tammy LaRace gave a mortgage for the property 
at 6 Brookburn Street in Springfield to Option One as security for a $103,200 loan; the mortgage was 
recorded that same day. On May 26, 2005, Option One executed an assignment of this mortgage in 
blank. 
According to Wells Fargo, Option One later assigned the LaRace mortgage to Bank of America in a 
July 28, 2005, flow sale and servicing agreement. Bank of America then assigned it to Asset Backed 
Funding Corporation (ABFC) in an October 1, 2005, mortgage loan purchase agreement. Finally, ABFC 
pooled the mortgage with others and assigned it to Wells Fargo, as trustee for the ABFC 2005-OPT 1 
Trust, ABFC Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2005-OPT 1, pursuant to a pooling and servicing 
agreement (PSA). 
For ease of reference, the chain of entities through which the LaRace mortgage allegedly passed 
before the foreclosure sale is: 
Option One Mortgage Corporation (originator and record holder) 
Bank of America 
Asset Backed Funding Corporation (depositor) 
Wells Fargo, as trustee for the ABFC 2005-OPT 1, ABFC Asset-Backed 
Certificates, Series 2005-OPT 1 
Veils Fargo did not provide the judge with a copy of the flow sale and servicing agreement, so there 
> no document in the record reflecting an assignment of the LaRace mortgage by Option One to 
ank of America. The plaintiff did produce an unexecuted copy of the mortgage loan purchase 
greement, which was an exhibit to the PSA. The mortgage loan purchase agreement provides that 
ank of America, as seller, "does hereby agree to and does hereby sell, assign, set over, and 
therwise convey to the Purchaser [ABFC], without recourse, on the Closing Date ... all of its right, 
tie and interest in and to each Mortgage Loan." The agreement makes reference to a schedule 
>ting the assigned mortgage loans, but this schedule is not in the record, so there was no 
Dcument before the judge showing that the LaRace mortgage was among the mortgage loans 
ssigned to the ABFC. 
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Wells Fargo did provide the judge with a copy of the PSA, which is an agreement between the ABFC 
(as depositor), Option One (as servicer), and Wells Fargo (as trustee), but this copy was 
downloaded from the Securities and Exchange Commission website and was not signed. The PSA 
provides that the depositor "does hereby transfer, assign, set over and otherwise convey to the 
Trustee, on behalf of the Trust ... all the right, title and interest of the Depositor... in and to ... 
each Mortgage Loan identified on the Mortgage Loan Schedules," and "does hereby deliver" to the 
trustee the original mortgage note, an original mortgage assignment "in form and substance 
acceptable for recording," and other documents pertaining to each mortgage. 
The copy of the PSA provided to the judge did not contain the loan schedules referenced in the 
agreement. Instead, Wells Fargo submitted a schedule that it represented identified the loans 
assigned in the PSA, which did not include property addresses, names of mortgagors, or any number 
that corresponds to the loan number or servicing number on the LaRace mortgage. Wells Fargo 
contends that a loan with the LaRace property's zip code and city is the LaRace mortgage loan 
because the payment history and loan amount matches the LaRace loan. 
On April 27, 2007, Wells Fargo filed a complaint under the Servicemembers Act in the Land Court to 
foreclose on the LaRace mortgage. The complaint represented Wells Fargo as the "owner (or 
assignee) and holder" of the mortgage given by the LaRaces for the property. A judgment issued on 
behalf of Wells Fargo on July 3, 2007, indicating that the LaRaces were not beneficiaries of the 
Servicemembers Act and that foreclosure could proceed in accordance with the terms of the power 
of sale. In June, 2007, Wells Fargo caused to be published in the Boston Globe the statutory notice 
of sale, identifying itself as the "present holder" of the mortgage. 
At the foreclosure sale on July 5, 2007, Wells Fargo, as trustee, purchased the LaRace property for 
$120,397.03, a value significantly below its estimated market value. Wells Fargo did not execute a 
statutory foreclosure affidavit or foreclosure deed until May 7, 2008. That same day, Option One, 
which was still the record holder of the LaRace mortgage, executed an assignment of the mortgage 
to Wells Fargo as trustee; the assignment was recorded on May 12, 2008. Although executed ten 
months after the foreclosure sale, the assignment declared an effective date of April 18, 2007, a 
date that preceded the publication of the notice of sale and the foreclosure sale. 
Discussion. The plaintiffs brought actions under G.L. c. 240, § 6, seeking declarations that the 
defendant mortgagors1 titles had been extinguished and that the plaintiffs were the fee simple 
Dwners of the foreclosed properties. As such, the plaintiffs bore the burden of establishing their 
entitlement to the relief sought. Sheriff's Meadow Found,, Inc. v. Bay-Courte Edgartown, Inc., 401 
viass, 267, 269 (1987). To meet this burden, they were required "not merely to demonstrate better 
:itle ... than the defendants possess, but ... to prove sufficient title to succeed in [the] action." Id. 
See NationsBanc Mtge. Corp. v. Eisenhauer, 49 Mass.App.Ct. 727, 730 (2000). There is no question 
:hat the relief the plaintiffs sought required them to establish the validity of the foreclosure sales on 
which their claim to clear title rested. 
Massachusetts does not require a mortgage holder to obtain judicial authorization to foreclose on a 
Tiortgaged property. See G.L. c. 183, § 21 ; G.L. c. 244, § 14. With the exception of the limited 
udicial procedure aimed at certifying that the mortgagor is not a beneficiary of the Servicemembers 
\ct , a mortgage holder can foreclose on a property, as the plaintiffs did here, by exercise of the 
statutory power of sale, if such a power is granted by the mortgage itself. See Beaton v. Land 
Zourt, 367 Mass. 385, 390-391, 393, appeal dismissed, 423 U.S. 806 (1975). 
Vhere a mortgage grants a mortgage holder the power of sale, as did both the Ibanez and LaRace 
nortgages, it includes by reference the power of sale set out in G.L. c. 183, § 21, and further 
egulated by G.L. c. 244, §§ 11-17C. Under G.L c. 183, § 21, after a mortgagor defaults in the 
>erformance of the underlying note, the mortgage holder may sell the property at a public auction 
md convey the property to the purchaser in fee simple, "and such sale shall forever bar the 
nortgagor and all persons claiming under him from all right and interest in the mortgaged premises, 
whether at law or in equity." Even where there is a dispute as to whether the mortgagor was in 
lefault or whether the party claiming to be the mortgage holder is the true mortgage holder, the 
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foreclosure goes forward unless the mortgagor files an action and obtains a court order enjoining the 
foreclosure. [FN15] See Beaton v. Land Court, supra at 393. 
Recognizing the substantial power that the statutory scheme affords to a mortgage holder to 
foreclose without immediate judicial oversight, we adhere to the familiar rule that "one who sells 
under a power [of sale] must follow strictly its terms. If he fails to do so there is no valid execution 
of the power, and the sale is wholly void." Moore v. Dick, 187 Mass. 207, 211 (1905). See Roche v. 
Farnsworth, 106 Mass. 509, 513 (1871) (power of sale contained in mortgage "must be executed in 
strict compliance with its terms"). See also McGreevey v. Charlestown Five Cents Sav. Bank, 294 
Mass. 480, 484 (1936). [FN16] 
One of the terms of the power of sale that must be strictly adhered to is the restriction on who is 
entitled to foreclose. The "statutory power of sale" can be exercised by "the mortgagee or his 
executors, administrators, successors or assigns." G.L c. 183, § 21. Under G.L c. 244, § 14, "[t]he 
mortgagee or person having his estate in the land mortgaged, or a person authorized by the power 
of sale, or the attorney duly authorized by a writing under seal, or the legal guardian or conservator 
of such mortgagee or person acting in the name of such mortgagee or person" is empowered to 
exercise the statutory power of sale. Any effort to foreclose by a party lacking "jurisdiction and 
authority" to carry out a foreclosure under these statutes is void. Chace v. Morse, 189 Mass. 559, 
561 (1905), citing Moore v. Dick, supra. See Davenport v. HSBC Bank USA, 275 Mich.App. 344, 347-
348 (2007) (attempt to foreclose by party that had not yet been assigned mortgage results in 
"structural defect that goes to the very heart of defendants ability to foreclose by advertisement," 
and renders foreclosure sale void). 
A related statutory requirement that must be strictly adhered to in a foreclosure by power of sale is 
the notice requirement articulated in G.L. c. 244, § 14. That statute provides that "no sale under 
such power shall be effectual to foreclose a mortgage, unless, previous to such sale," advance 
notice of the foreclosure sale has been provided to the mortgagee, to other interested parties, and 
by publication in a newspaper published in the town where the mortgaged land lies or of general 
circulation in that town. Id. The manner in which the notice of the proposed sale shall be given is 
one of the important terms of the power, and a strict compliance with it is essential to the valid 
exercise of the power." Moore v. Dick, supra at 212. See Chace v. Morse, supra ("where a certain 
notice is prescribed, a sale without any notice, or upon a notice lacking the essential requirements 
of the written power, would be void as a proceeding for foreclosure"). See also McGreevey v. 
Charlestown Five Cents Sav. Bank, supra. Because only a present holder of the mortgage is 
authorized to foreclose on the mortgaged property, and because the mortgagor is entitled to know 
who is foreclosing and selling the property, the failure to identify the holder of the mortgage in the 
notice of sale may render the notice defective and the foreclosure sale void. [FN17] See Roche v. 
Farnsworth, supra (mortgage sale void where notice of sale identified original mortgagee but not 
mortgage holder at time of notice and sale). See also Bottomly v. Kabachnick, 13 Mass.App.Ct. 480, 
483-484 (1982) (foreclosure void where holder of mortgage not identified in notice of sale). 
For the plaintiffs to obtain the judicial declaration of clear title that they seek, they had to prove 
:heir authority to foreclose under the power of sale and show their compliance with the requirements 
:>n which this authority rests. Here, the plaintiffs were not the original mortgagees to whom the 
)ower of sale was granted; rather, they claimed the authority to foreclose as the eventual 
assignees of the original mortgagees. Under the plain language of G.L c. 183, § 21, and G.L c. 244, 
i 14, the plaintiffs had the authority to exercise the power of sale contained in the Ibanez and 
.aRace mortgages only if they were the assignees of the mortgages at the time of the notice of sale 
md the subsequent foreclosure sale. See In re Schwartz, 366 B.R. 265, 269 (Bankr.D.Mass.2007) 
"Acquiring the mortgage after the entry and foreclosure sale does not satisfy the Massachusetts 
tatute"). [FN18] See also Jeff-Ray Corp. v. Jacobson, 566 So.2d 885, 886 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1990) 
per curiam) (foreclosure action could not be based on assignment of mortgage dated four months 
fter commencement of foreclosure proceeding). 
he plaintiffs claim that the securitization documents they submitted establish valid assignments 
nat made them the holders of the Ibanez and LaRace mortgages before the notice of sale and t-hp 
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foreclosure sale. We turn, then, to the documentation submitted by the plaintiffs to determine 
whether it met the requirements of a valid assignment. 
Like a sale of land itself, the assignment of a mortgage is a conveyance of an interest in land that 
requires a writing signed by the grantor. See G.L c. 183, § 3; Saint Patrick's Religious, Ecluc. & 
Charitable Ass'n v. Hale, 227 Mass. 175, 177 (1917). In a "title theory state" like Massachusetts, a 
mortgage is a transfer of legal title in a property to secure a debt. See Faneuil Investors Group, Ltd. 
Partnership v. Selectmen of Dennis, 458 Mass. 1, 6 (2010). Therefore, when a person borrows 
money to purchase a home and gives the lender a mortgage, the homeowner-mortgagor retains only 
equitable title in the home; the legal title is held by the mortgagee. See Vee Jay Realty Trust Co. v. 
DiCroce, 360 Mass. 751, 753 (1972), quoting Dolliver v. St. Joseph Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 128 Mass. 
315, 316 (1880) (although "as to all the world except the mortgagee, a mortgagor is the owner of 
the mortgaged lands," mortgagee has legal title to property); Maglione v. BancBoston Mtge. Corp., 
29 Mass.App.Ct. 88, 90 (1990). Where, as here, mortgage loans are pooled together in a trust and 
:onverted into mortgage-backed securities, the underlying promissory notes serve as financial 
nstruments generating a potential income stream for investors, but the mortgages securing these 
lotes are still legal title to someone's home or farm and must be treated as such. 
:ocusing first on the Ibanez mortgage, U.S. Bank argues that it was assigned the mortgage under 
he trust agreement described in the PPM, but it did not submit a copy of this trust agreement to 
he judge. The PPM, however, described the trust agreement as an agreement to be executed in the 
uture, so it only furnished evidence of an intent to assign mortgages to U.S. Bank, not proof of their 
ictual assignment. Even if there were an executed trust agreement with language of present 
issignment, U.S. Bank did not produce the schedule of loans and mortgages that was an exhibit to 
hat agreement, so it failed to show that the Ibanez mortgage was among the mortgages to be 
ssigned by that agreement. Finally, even if there were an executed trust agreement with the 
squired schedule, U.S. Bank failed to furnish any evidence that the entity assigning the mortgage--
tructured Asset Securities Corppration--ever held the mortgage to be assigned. The last 
ssignment of the mortgage on record was from Rose Mortgage to Option One; nothing was 
ubmitted to the judge indicating that Option One ever assigned the mortgage to anyone before the 
)reclosure sale. [FN19] Thus, based on the documents submitted to the judge, Option One, not 
.S. Bank, was the mortgage holder at the time of the foreclosure, and U.S. Bank did not have the 
uthority to foreclose the mortgage. 
urning to the LaRace mortgage, Wells Fargo claims that, before it issued the foreclosure notice, it 
as assigned the LaRace mortgage under the PSA. The PSA, in contrast with U.S. Bank's PPM, uses 
\e language of a present assignment ("does hereby ... assign" and "does hereby deliver") rather 
lan an intent to assign in the future. But the mortgage loan schedule Wells Fargo submitted failed 
) identify with adequate specificity the LaRace mortgage as one of the mortgages assigned in the 
5A. Moreover, Wells Fargo provided the judge with no document that reflected that the ABFC 
lepositor) held the LaRace mortgage that it was purportedly assigning in the PSA. As with the 
anez loan, the record holder of the LaRace loan was Option One, and nothing was submitted to the 
dge which demonstrated that the LaRace loan was ever assigned by Option One to another entity 
sfore the publication of the notice and the sale. 
here a plaintiff files a complaint asking for a declaration of clear title after a mortgage foreclosure, 
judge is entitled to ask for proof that the foreclosing entity was the mortgage holder at the time of 
e notice of sale and foreclosure, or was one of the parties authorized to foreclose under G.L c. 
3, § 21, and G.L. c. 244, § 14. A plaintiff that cannot make this modest showing cannot justly 
Dclaim that it was unfairly denied a declaration of clear title. See In re Schwartz, supra at 266 
When HomEq [Servicing Corporation] was required to prove its authority to conduct the sale, and 
spite having been given ample opportunity to do so, what it produced instead was a jumble of 
cuments and conclusory statements, some of which are not supported by the documents and 
leed even contradicted by them"). See also Bayview Loan Servicing, LLC v. Nelson, 382 IILApp.3d 
84, 1188 (2008) (reversing grant of summary judgment in favor of financial entity in foreclosure 
kion, where there was "no evidence that [the entity] ever obtained any legal interest in the 
Dject property"). 
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We do not suggest that an assignment must be in recordable form at the time of the notice of sale 
or the subsequent foreclosure sale, although recording is likely the better practice. Where a pool of 
mortgages is assigned to a securitized trust, the executed agreement that assigns the pool of 
mortgages, with a schedule of the pooled mortgage loans that clearly and specifically identifies the 
mortgage at issue as among those assigned, may suffice to establish the trustee as the mortgage 
holder. However, there must be proof that the assignment was made by a party that itself held the 
mortgage. See In re Samuels, 415 B.R. 8, 20 (Bankr„D.Mass.2009). A foreclosing entity may provide 
a complete chain of assignments linking it to the record holder of the mortgage, or a single 
assignment from the record holder of the mortgage. See In re Parrish, 326 B.R. 708, 720 
(Bankr.N.D.Ohio 2005) ("If the claimant acquired the note and mortgage from the original lender or 
from another party who acquired it from the original lender, the claimant can meet its burden 
through evidence that traces the loan from the original lender to the claimant"). The key in either 
case is that the foreclosing entity must hold the mortgage at the time of the notice and sale in order 
accurately to identify itself as the present holder in the notice and in order to have the authority to 
foreclose under the power of sale (or the foreclosing entity must be one of the parties authorized to 
foreclose under G.L c. 183, § 21, and G.L c. 244, § 14). 
The judge did not err in concluding that the securitization documents submitted by the plaintiffs 
failed to demonstrate that they were the holders of the Ibanez and LaRace mortgages, respectively, 
at the time of the publication of the notices and the sales. The judge, therefore, did not err in 
rendering judgments against the plaintiffs and in denying the plaintiffs1 motions to vacate the 
judgments. [FN20] 
We now turn briefly to three other arguments raised by the plaintiffs on appeal. First, the plaintiffs 
initially contended that the assignments in blank executed by Option One, identifying the assignor 
but not the assignee, not only "evidence[ ] and confirm[ ] the assignments that occurred by virtue 
of the securitization agreements," but "are effective assignments in their own right." But in their 
reply briefs they conceded that the assignments in blank did not constitute a lawful assignment of 
the mortgages. Their concession is appropriate. We have long held that a conveyance of real 
property, such as a mortgage, that does not name the assignee conveys nothing and is void; we do 
not regard an assignment of land in blank as giving legal title in land to the bearer of the assignment. 
See Flavin v. Morrissey, 327 Mass. 217, 219 (1951); Macurda v. Fuller, 225 Mass. 341, 344 (1916). 
See also G.L. c. 183, § 3. 
Second, the plaintiffs contend that, because they held the mortgage note, they had a sufficient 
financial interest in the mortgage to allow them to foreclose. In Massachusetts, where a note has 
been assigned but there is no written assignment of the mortgage underlying the note, the 
assignment of the note does not carry with it the assignment of the mortgage. Barnes v. Boardman, 
149 Mass. 106, 114 (1889). Rather, the holder of the mortgage holds the mortgage in trust for the 
purchaser of the note, who has an equitable right to obtain an assignment of the mortgage, which 
may be accomplished by filing an action in court and obtaining an equitable order of assignment. Id. 
("In some jurisdictions it is held that the mere transfer of the debt, without any assignment or even 
mention of the mortgage, carries the mortgage with it, so as to enable the assignee to assert his 
title in an action at law.... This doctrine has not prevailed in Massachusetts, and the tendency of 
the decisions here has been, that in such cases the rrDrtgagee would hold the legal title in trust for 
the purchaser of the debt, and that the latter might obtain a conveyance by a bill in equity"). See 
Young v. Miller, 6 Gray 152, 154 (1856). In the absence of a valid written assignment of a mortgage 
Dr a court order of assignment, the mortgage holder remains unchanged. This common-law principle 
was later incorporated in the statute enacted in 1912 establishing the statutory power of sale, 
which grants such a power to "the mortgagee or his executors, administrators, successors or 
assigns," but not to a party that is the equitable beneficiary of a mortgage held by another. G.L c. 
L83, § 21, inserted by St. 1912, c. 502, § 6. 
"hird, the plaintiffs initially argued that postsale assignments were sufficient to establish their 
luthority to foreclose, and now argue that these assignments are sufficient when taken in 
.onjunction with the evidence of a presale assignment. They argue that the use of postsaie 
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assignments was customary in the industry, and point to Title Standard No. 58(3) issued by the Real 
Estate Bar Association for Massachusetts, which declares: "A title is not defective by reason of . . . 
[t]he recording of an Assignment of Mortgage executed either prior, or subsequent, to foreclosure 
where said Mortgage has been foreclosed, of record, by the Assignee." [FN21] To the extent that 
the plaintiffs rely on this title standard for the proposition that an entity that does not hold a 
mortgage may foreclose on a property, and then cure the cloud on title by a later assignment of a 
mortgage, their reliance is misplaced because this proposition is contrary to G.L c. 183, § 21, and 
G.L c. 244, § 14. If the plaintiffs did not have their assignments to the Ibanez and LaRace 
mortgages at the time of the publication of the notices and the sales, they lacked authority to 
foreclose under G.L c. 183, § 21, and G.L c. 244, § 14, and their published claims to be the present 
holders of the mortgages were false. Nor may a postforeclosure assignment be treated as a pre-
foreclosure assignment simply by declaring an "effective date" that precedes the notice of sale and 
foreclosure, as did Option One's assignment of the LaRace mortgage to Wells Fargo. Because an 
assignment of a mortgage is a transfer of legal title, it becomes effective with respect to the power 
of sale only on the transfer; it cannot become effective before the transfer. See In re Schwartz, 
supra at 269. 
However, we do not disagree with Title Standard No. 58(3) that, where an assignment is 
:onfirmatory of an earlier, valid assignment made prior to the publication of notice and execution of 
:he sale, that confirmatory assignment may be executed and recorded after the foreclosure, and 
toing so will not make the title defective. A valid assignment of a mortgage gives the holder of that 
nortgage the statutory power to sell after a default regardless whether the assignment has been 
ecorded. See G.L c. 183, § 21 ; MacFarlane v. Thompson, 241 Mass. 486, 489 (1922). Where the 
jarlier assignment is not in recordable form or bears some defect, a written assignment executed 
ifter foreclosure that confirms the earlier assignment may be properly recorded. See Bon v. Graves, 
116 Mass. 440, 444-445 (1914). A confirmatory assignment, however, cannot confirm an assignment 
hat was not validly made earlier or backdate an assignment being made for the first time. See 
fcap/en v. Blanchard, 187 Mass. 73, 76 (1904) (confirmatory deed "creates no title" but "takes the 
lace of the original deed, and is evidence of the making of the former conveyance as of the time 
then it was made"). Where there is no prior valid assignment, a subsequent assignment by the 
Tortgage holder to the note holder is not a confirmatory assignment because there is no earlier 
rritten assignment to confirm. In this case, based on the record before the judge, the plaintiffs 
ailed to prove that they obtained valid written assignments of the Ibanez and LaRace mortgages 
efore their foreclosures, so the postforeclosure assignments were not confirmatory of earlier valid 
ssignments. 
nally, we reject the plaintiffs' request that our ruling be prospective in its application. A 
-ospective ruling is only appropriate, in limited circumstances, when we make a significant change in 
le common law. See Papadopoulos v. Target Corp., 457 Mass. 368, 384 (2010) (noting "normal rule 
:
 retroactivity"); Payton v. Abbott Labs, 386 Mass. 540, 565 (1982). We have not done so here. 
ie legal principles and requirements we set forth are well established in our case law and our 
atutes. All that has changed is the plaintiffs1 apparent failure to abide by those principles and 
quirements in the rush to sell mortgage-backed securities. 
inclusion. For the reasons stated, we agree with the judge that the plaintiffs did not demonstrate 
at they were the holders of the Ibanez and LaRace mortgages at the time that they foreclosed 
ese properties, and therefore failed to demonstrate that they acquired fee simple title to these 
operties by purchasing them at the foreclosure sale. 
dgments affirmed. 
)RDY, 1 (concurring, with whom Botsford, J., joins). 
oncur fully in the opinion of the court, and write separately only to underscore that what is 
prising about these cases is not the statement of principles articulated by the court regarding 
e law and the law of foreclosure in Massachusetts, but rather the utter carelessness with which 
i plaintiff banks documented the titles to their assets. There is no dispute that the mortgagors of 
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the properties in question had defaulted on their obligations, and that the mortgaged properties were 
subject to foreclosure. Before commencing such an action, however, the holder of an assigned 
mortgage needs to take care to ensure that his legal paperwork is in order. Although there was no 
apparent actual unfairness here to the mortgagors, that is not the point. Foreclosure is a powerful 
act with significant consequences, and Massachusetts law has always required that it proceed 
strictly in accord with the statutes that govern it. As the opinion of the court notes, such strict 
compliance is necessary because Massachusetts is both a title theory State and allows for 
extrajudicial foreclosure. 
The type of sophisticated transactions leading up to the accumulation of the notes and mortgages in 
question in these cases and their securitization, and, ultimately the sale of mortgaged-backed 
securities, are not barred nor even burdened by the requirements of Massachusetts law. The plaintiff 
banks, who brought these cases to clear the titles that they acquired at their own foreclosure sales, 
have simply failed to prove that the underlying assignments of the mortgages that they allege (and 
would have) entitled them to foreclose ever existed in any legally cognizable form before they 
exercised the power of sale that accompanies those assignments. The court's opinion clearly states 
that such assignments do not need to be in recordable form or recorded before the foreclosure, but 
they do have to have been effectuated. 
What is more complicated, and not addressed in this opinion, because the issue was not before us, 
is the effect of the conduct of banks such as the plaintiffs here, on a bona fide third-party 
purchaser who may have relied on the foreclosure title of the bank and the confirmative assignment 
and affidavit of foreclosure recorded by the bank subsequent to that foreclosure but prior to the 
purchase by the third party, especially where the party whose property was foreclosed was in fact 
in violation of the mortgage covenants, had notice of the foreclosure, and took no action to contest 
it. 
FIM1. For the Structured Asset Securities Corporation Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, 
Series 2006-Z. 
FN2. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., trustee, vs. Mark A. LaRace & another. 
FN3. The Appeals Court granted the plaintiffs' motion to consolidate these cases. 
FN4. Chief Justice Marshall participated in the deliberation on this case prior to her retirement. 
FN5. We acknowledge the amicus briefs filed by the Attorney General; the Real Estate Bar 
Association for Massachusetts, Inc.; Marie McDonnell; and the National Consumer Law Center, 
together with Darlene Manson, Germano DePina, Robert Lane, Ann Coiley, Roberto Szumik, and 
Geraldo Dosanjos. 
FN6. The uncertainty surrounding the first issue was the reason the plaintiffs sought a 
declaration of clear title in order to obtain title insurance for these properties. The second 
issue was raised by the judge in the LaRace case at a January 5, 2009, case management 
conference. 
FN7. The judge also concluded that the Boston Globe was a newspaper of general circulation in 
Springfield, so the foreclosures were not rendered invalid on that ground because notice was 
published in that newspaper. 
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FN8. In the third case, LaSalle Bank National Association, trustee for the certificate holders of 
Bear Stearns Asset Backed Securities I, LLC Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2007-HE2 vs. 
Freddy Rosario, the judge concluded that the mortgage foreclosure "was not rendered invalid 
by its failure to record the assignment reflecting its status as holder of the mortgage prior to 
the foreclosure since it was, in fact, the holder by assignment at the time of the foreclosure, it 
truthfully claimed that status in the notice, and it could have produced proof of that status 
(the unrecorded assignment) if asked." 
FN9. On June 1, 2009, attorneys for the defendant mortgagors filed their appearance in the 
cases for the first time. 
FN10. The LaRace defendants allege that the documents submitted to the judge following the 
plaintiffs1 motions to vacate judgment are not properly in the record before us. They also allege 
that several of these documents are not properly authenticated. Because we affirm the 
judgment on other grounds, we do not address these concerns, and assume that these 
documents are properly before us and were adequately authenticated. 
FN11. This signed and notarized document states: "FOR VALUE RECEIVED, the undersigned 
hereby grants, assigns and transfers to all beneficial 
interest under that certain Mortgage dated December 1, 2005 executed by Antonio Ibanez...." 
FN12. The Structured Asset Securities Corporation is a wholly owned direct subsidiary of 
Lehman Commercial Paper Inc., which is in turn a wholly owned, direct subsidiary of Lehman 
Brothers Holdings Inc. 
FN13. As implemented in Massachusetts, a mortgage holder is required to go to court to obtain 
a judgment declaring that the mortgagor is not a beneficiary of the Servicemembers Act before 
proceeding to foreclosure. St. 1943, c. 57, as amended through St. 1998, c. 142. 
FN14. The Land Court judge questioned whether American Home Mortgage Servicing, Inc., was 
in fact a successor in interest to Option One. Given our affirmance of the judgment on other 
grounds, we need not address this question. 
FN15. An alternative to foreclosure through the right of statutory sale is foreclosure by entry, 
by which a mortgage holder who peaceably enters a property and remains for three years after 
recording a certificate or memorandum of entry forecloses the mortgagor's right of redemption. 
See G.L c. 244, §§ 1, 2; Joyner v. Lenox Sav. Bank, 322 Mass. 46, 52-53 (1947). A 
foreclosure by entry may provide a separate ground for a claim of clear title apart from the 
foreclosure by execution of the power of sale. See, e.g., Grabiel v. Michelson, 297 Mass. 227, 
228-229 (1937). Because the plaintiffs do not claim clear title based on foreclosure by entry, 
we do not discuss it further. 
FN16. We recognize that a mortgage holder must not only act in strict compliance with its 
power of sale but must also "act in good faith and ... use reasonable diligence to protect the 
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interests of the mortgagor," and this responsibility is "more exacting" where the mortgage 
holder becomes the buyer at the foreclosure sale, as occurred here. See Williams v. Resolution 
GGF Oy, All Mass. 377, 382-383 (1994), quoting Seppala &Aho Constr. Co. v. Petersen, 373 
Mass. 316, 320 (1977). Because the issue was not raised by the defendant mortgagors or the 
judge, we do not consider whether the plaintiffs breached this obligation. 
FN17. The form of foreclosure notice provided in G.L c. 244, § 14, calls for the present holder 
of the mortgage to identify itself and sign the notice. While the statute permits other forms to 
be used and allows the statutory form to be "altered as circumstances require/ G.L. c. 244, § 
14, we do not interpret this flexibility to suggest that the present holder of the mortgage 
need not identify itself in the notice. 
FN18. The plaintiffs were not authorized to foreclose by virtue of any of the other provisions of 
G.L c. 244, § 14: they were not the guardian or conservator, or acting in the name of, a 
person so authorized; nor were they the attorney duly authorized by a writing under seal. 
FN19. Ibanez challenges the validity of this assignment to Option One. Because of the failure 
of U.S. Bank to document any preforeclosure sale assignment or chain of assignments by which 
it obtained the Ibanez mortgage from Option One, it is unnecessary to address the validity of 
the assignment from Rose Mortgage to Option One. 
FN20. The plaintiffs have not pressed the procedural question whether the judge exceeded his 
authority in rendering judgment against them on their motions for default judgment, and we do 
not address it here. 
FN21. Title Standard No. 58(3) issued by the Real Estate Bar Association for Massachusetts 
continues: "However, if the Assignment is not dated prior, or stated to be effective prior, to 
the commencement of a foreclosure, then a foreclosure sale after April 19, 2007 may be 
subject to challenge in the 
Bankruptcy Court," citing In re Schwartz, 366 B.R. 265 (Bankr.D.Mass.2007). 
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